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Abstract
This paper proposes a theoretical framework to analyze the impacts of credit and technol-
ogy shocks on business cycle dynamics, where firms rely on banks and households for capital
financing. Firms are identical ex ante but differ ex post due to different realizations of firm
specific technology shocks, possibly leading to default by some firms. The paper advances a
new modelling approach for the analysis of financial intermediation and firm defaults that takes
account of the financial implications of such defaults for both households and banks. Results
from a calibrated version of the model highlights the role of financial institutions in the trans-
mission of credit and technology shocks to the real economy. A positive credit shock, defined as
a rise in the loan to deposit ratio, increases output, consumption, hours and productivity, and
reduces the spread between loan and deposit rates. The effects of the credit shock tend to be
highly persistent even without price rigidities and habit persistence in consumption behaviour.
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est Rate Spread, Real Financial Linkages.
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1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis and the ensuing economic recession have highlighted the importance of
inter-linkages between financial markets and the real economy, in particular the role that private
credit plays in the transmission of real and financial shocks. Empirical evidence suggests that bank
credit plays an important role in explaining business cycle dynamics, in particular output growth,
inflation and interest rates in advanced economies since the late 1970s. As shown in Helbling,
Huidrom, Kose, and Otrok (2011) and Xu (2010), a negative shock to US real credit has significant
adverse effects on output and interest rates in the US, as well as in other advanced economies such
as the Euro Area and the UK.
Over the past two decades, there have been important advances in the theoretical literature on
the macroeconomic impact of financial frictions. Among others see Kiyotaki and Moore (1997),
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) and more recently Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010),
Carlstrom, Fuerst, and Paustian (2010), Curdia and Woodford (2010) and Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2010). By introducing credit market frictions (due to information asymmetry, agency costs or col-
lateral constraints) in the demand and supply for credit, research on the credit and cost channels of
monetary policy show that such frictions act as a financial accelerator that leads to an amplification
of business cycles, and highlight the mechanisms through which credit market conditions are likely
to impact the real economy. In addition, recent literature on modelling the banking sector sheds
light on the relationship between bank lending and investment decisions by firms and how credit
risks relate to the pricing of bank loans. See, for example, Freixas and Rochet (2008) and Pesaran,
Schuermann, Treutler, and Weiner (2006).
The existing literature on financial frictions is largely monetary in nature and is mainly aimed
at obtaining a better understanding of the transmission mechanisms for monetary policy shocks.
They are motivated by the limitations of traditional demand side monetary models in matching
VAR-based empirical evidence on the effects of monetary policy shocks. See, for example Bernanke
and Gertler (1995), Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). Recently, a number of papers have
developed models with financial frictions to investigate the effects of unconventional monetary
policy such as direct lending by central banks, as observed in the 2008 financial crisis. Notable
examples are Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010) and Gertler and Karadi (2011). In this paper
we have a different focus and examine the impact of credit shocks on business cycle dynamics, by
explicitly allowing for firm defaults, which distinguishes our contribution from the related literature
that impose collateral constraints, and hence rule out default in equilibrium. See, for example,
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Carlstrom, Fuerst, and Paustian
(2010). Collateral constraints are introduced as a way of ensuring that borrowers can re-pay their
debts, which in most cases rule out the possibility of firm defaults almost by design.
Our paper is more closely related to the work by Freixas and Rochet (2008) on the microeco-
nomics of banking, and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999, BGG), on modelling the producer
sector and firm defaults.1 Our aim is to develop a relatively parsimonious theoretical model for the
analysis of the impact of credit and technology shocks on the real economy, making a distinction
between idiosyncratic and common technology shocks. The proposed framework comprises a large
1Other related papers that allow for the possibility of firm defaults include Fiore and Tristani (2009) and Chris-
tiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010).
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number of firms, a representative household, and a banking sector that operates competitively.
Firms are identical ex ante and live from period to period. At the start of each period, firms enter
the market and decide on the optimal levels of labour input and capital stock for their operation.
Firms receive initial funds from the household sector which can be interpreted as private equity
investment from the household, and augment these funds by borrowing from the banking sector.
These financing arrangements are made prior to the realisation of idiosyncratic and common tech-
nology shocks. Some firms may default if the realised technology shocks are unfavourable, such
that the firm’s revenue is not sufficient to repay the bank loan. We assume that the product market
is competitive and while some firms may fail each period, entry is free. The banking sector receives
deposits from households before the arrival of a credit shock, which then determines the total level
of loanable funds to the firms. The banking sector receives loan repayment from the non-defaulted
firms and seizes the revenues of defaulted firms (if any) to partially cover losses. The equilibrium
loan rate is in turn affected by the economy wide default probability.
The main contribution of the paper in relation to the literature is fourfold: first, we advance a
new modelling framework for the analysis of financial intermediation and firm defaults that take
account of the financial implication of such defaults for both households and banks, without using
collateral constraints and monitoring. Our modelling of firm defaults differs from BGG in that
idiosyncratic shocks affect productivity rather than the return on capital in the economy, which
keeps the model tractable and establishes a direct link between credit risk and productivity. The
timing of labour and capital decisions and the fact that firms are subject to idiosyncratic technology
shocks are essential for modelling firm defaults in equilibrium. Second, we consider the impact of
exogenous (but possibly persistent) credit shocks and examine the quantitative importance of such
shocks for business cycle fluctuations. A positive credit shock can be viewed as a sudden increase
in the level of bank loans relative to bank deposits in the economy, probably due to an increase in
liquidity provision by the banking sector or the central bank. We are able to generate theoretical
impulse responses that are in line with empirical results on the responses of output and short term
interest rates to a US credit shock. Third, the paper contributes to the analysis of steady states in
model economies that take account of non-linearities and possible unit roots in the economy wide
technology process. Finally, by allowing for a unit root in labour hours and by incorporating a
form of non-separable utility function popularised by Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman (1988),
the model generates responses in hours and productivity to technology shocks that are consistent
with empirical evidence.
The main findings of our paper are as follows. First, a positive credit shock implies an increase
in the level of bank loans relative to deposits. The rise in the level of loans leads to an increase in the
available capital in the economy and consequently an expansion in investment and output, which
is largely consistent with the empirical results in Xu (2010). The increase in the level of loanable
funds also drives down the loan rate and the spread between loan and deposit rates. Deposit rate
rises following the credit shock, which yields an increase in the level of household deposits with
banks, consistent with the zero normal profit condition assumed for the banking sector. Labour
hours rises on impact, which lead to higher household income and consequently more consumption.
The model also predicts an increase in productivity, since the rise in output is found to be larger
compared with that in labour hours.
Second, a positive technology shock increases both the loan and deposit rates, but has no
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effects on the spread between the two rates. Consumption and output rise initially, and we observe
a correction before the economy returns to equilibrium after around 5 quarters. The impulse
responses obtained from our model match the empirical evidence that positive technology shocks
lead to short-run declines in hours and a rise in productivity (see for example Gali, 1999, Francis
and Ramey, 2005 and Canova, Lopez-Salido, and Michelacci, 2010). Using our model we are able
to generate responses in hours that are in line with the empirical evidence without introducing
sticky price (Gali, 1999) or habit formation in consumption and adjustment cost in investment
(Francis and Ramey, 2005 and Smets and Wouters, 2007).
Finally, our calibrated results show that the speed of convergence to equilibrium is four times
faster for the technology shock as compared to the credit shock, while the impact of a credit shock
on output is twice as large as that of a technology shock, under a benchmark parametrisation. Our
finding is consistent with empirical studies on the output effect of financial crisis, which suggest
that recessions associated with financial crises have been more severe and more long lasting than
recessions associated with other shocks (see, for example, IMF, World Economic Outlook, April
2009, Chapter 3). The prolonged impact of the credit shock also reflects the high persistence in
the loan to deposit ratio that we observe empirically.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the relevant
literature. Section 3 presents the DSGE model of credit, leverage and default. Section 4 sets out
the first order equilibrium conditions, derives the steady states, and the solution of the model.
Section 5 discusses the parameterisation of the model for the calibration exercises. Section 6
provides the key results on the impulse responses of positive credit and technology shocks. Section
7 offers some concluding remarks.
2 Literature Review and Motivation
In this section, we provide an overview of two aspects of macroeconomic literature that relates to
our contributions, namely modelling of financial intermediation and the effects of technology shocks
on hours and labour productivity. We start with an overview of models on financial intermediation
that focus on the demand and supply of credit and highlight the relationship between financial
frictions and monetary policy. We then review alternative approaches in the literature on modelling
credit risk and firm defaults. Finally, to motivate our results on the effects of technology shocks,
we also provide an overview of the recent debate on the effects of technology shocks on hours and
productivity.
2.1 Modelling of financial frictions
Over the past decade, there has been significant advances in the theoretical literature on the
macroeconomic implications of financial imperfections. These advances are partly motivated by the
limitations of traditional monetary policy channel in explaining the time series empirical evidence
on the effects of monetary policy on the economy.2 This has led to a search for alternative theories.
2For example, Bernanke and Gertler (1995) argue that it is difficult to explain the magnitude, timing and compo-
sition of the economy’s response to monetary policy shocks solely in terms of conventional interest rate (neoclassical
cost of capital) effects. Empirically, the interest rate spike associated with an unanticipated monetary tightening is
largely transitory, yet some important components of spending do not begin to react until after most of the interest
rate effect has past.
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One line of the research focuses on the credit channels of monetary policy and examines the extent
to which imperfect information and other financial frictions in credit market affect the transmission
of monetary policy.3 Financial market imperfections could be due to a number of factors: first, the
asymmetry of information between lenders and borrowers (see, for example, Bernanke and Gertler,
1995, Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist, 1999 and Gilchrist, 2004), which induces the lenders to
engage in costly monitoring activities.4 The extra cost of monitoring by lenders gives rise to the
external finance premium for the firms, which represents a wedge between a firm’s own opportunity
cost of funds and the cost of external finance. Higher asset prices improve firm balance sheets,
reduce the external finance premium, increase borrowing and stimulate investment spending. The
rise in investment further increases asset prices and net worth, giving rise to an amplified impact on
investment and output in the economy. Financial frictions act as a financial accelerator that leads
to an amplification of business cycle fluctuations, working their effects through a “credit channel”
of monetary policy.
Financial frictions could also stem from the lending collateral constraints faced by borrowers.
Examples of this line of research can be found in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Carlstrom, Fuerst,
and Paustian (2010), and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010). Credit constraints arise because lenders
cannot force borrowers to repay their debts unless the debts are secured by some form of collateral.
Borrowers’ credit limits are affected by the prices of the collateralized assets, and these asset prices
are in turn influenced by the size of the credit limits, which affects investment and demand for
assets in the economy. The dynamic interaction between borrowing limits and the price of assets
amplifies the impact of a small initial shock and generate large and persistent fluctuations in output
and asset prices in the economy.
In addition to frictions in the demand for credit from firms, a number of recent papers argue
that banks themselves are also subject to frictions in raising loanable funds and show that the
supply side of the credit market also contributes to shock propagation, affecting output dynamics
in the economy. In Meh and Moran (2010), moral hazard arises as the monitoring activities
of banks are not publicly observable. Depositors are concerned that banks may not monitor
entrepreneurs adequately and demand that banks invest their own net worth (bank capital) in the
financing of entrepreneurial projects. Therefore, the capital position of banks affects their ability
to attract loanable funds. The extra financial friction between banks and their depositors constrain
the supply of credit and hence the leverage of entrepreneurs in the economy. The “bank capital
channel” propagates a negative technology shock through a reduction in the profitability of bank
lending, making it more difficult for banks to attract loanable funds. Banks are forced to finance
a larger proportion of capital investments using their own capital, and reduce bank lending, since
bank capital mostly consists of retained earning and can not adjust immediately. Reduced bank
lending in turn lead to a fall in investment and economic activity.5
Several papers argue that the degree of competition in the banking sector, or banks’ rate setting
3According to Bernanke and Gertler (1995), the credit channel is not considered as a distinct, free-standing
alternative to the traditional monetary transmission mechanism, but rather a set of factors that amplify and propagate
conventional interest rate effects.
4For example, costly state verification, in which lenders must pay a fixed “auditing cost” in order to observe
an individual borrower’s realised return, first introduced in Townsend (1979) and further developed in Bernanke,
Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999).
5Other papers using a similar approach include Chen (2001), Meh and Moran (2004) and Aikman and Paustian
(2006).
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strategies contribute to frictions on the supply side of credit markets, which are also important
in explaining macroeconomic fluctuations. Gerali, Neri, Sessa, and Signoretti (2010) model an
imperfectly competitive banking sector that enjoy some degree of market power in loan and deposit
markets and set different rates for households and firms. Based on Bayesian estimation using euro
area data, they find that banking sector attenuates the effects of monetary policy shocks, as sticky
rates moderate the impact of changes in the policy rate on both consumption and investment.
On the other hand, financial intermediation increases the propagation of supply shocks originating
in credit markets, which is linked to asset prices and borrowers’ balance sheet conditions. In a
related paper, Hulsewig, Mayer, and Wollmershaeuser (2006) study the role of banks via the “cost
channels” of monetary policy and assume that banks extend loans to firms in an environment
of monopolistic competition by setting the loan rate according to a Calvo-type staggered price
setting mechanism.6 These authors find that frictions in the loan market influence the propagation
of monetary policy shocks as the pass-through of a change in the money market rate to the loan
rate is incomplete. However, the strength of the cost channel is mitigated as banks shelter firms
from monetary policy shocks by smoothing the lending rates.7
In addition to the above channels of monetary policy, Adrian and Shin (2009) propose that
the balance sheet of financial intermediaries also contribute to a “risk-taking channel”, involving
bank’s net interest margin, defined as the difference between the total interest income on the asset
side and the interest expense on the liabilities side of bank’s balance sheet. A rise in the net interest
margin (due to changes in policy rate) raises the profitability of bank lending and increases the
present value of bank income, therefore boosting the forward looking measures of bank capital. As
banks expand their balance sheets, the market price of risk falls and the supply of credit increases.
As a result, financial intermediaries drive the financial cycle and impact the real economy through
their influence on the determination of the price of risk.
A number of recent papers also develop quantitative models to explore the effects of unconven-
tional monetary policy instruments such as direct lending by central banks, to capture the policy
responses following the financial crisis of 2008. See, for example, Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and
Gertler and Karadi (2011). Gertler and Karadi (2011) interpret unconventional monetary policy
as expanding central bank credit intermediation to offset a disruption of private financial inter-
mediation. They model unconventional monetary policy by allowing the central bank to act as
intermediary by borrowing funds from savers and then lending them to investors. The central bank
is distinct from private intermediaries (commercial banks) in two aspects. First, the central bank
does not face constraints on its leverage ratio. Second, public intermediation is likely to be less ef-
ficient than the private intermediation. Their findings suggest that during a financial crisis like the
recent one, the balance sheet constraints on private intermediaries tighten, raising the benefits and
needs from central bank intermediation. In a related paper, Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) consider
two additional unconventional monetary policy instruments, including discount window lending to
banks secured by private credit and direct assistance to large financial institutions including equity
6“Cost channels” of monetary policy captures the impact of interest rates and credit conditions on firms’ short
run ability to produce (by investing in working capital). See, for example, Barth and Ramey (2000), Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), Chowdhury, Hoffmann, and Schabert (2006) and Ravenna and Walsh (2006).
7One explanation for the imperfection in the loan market is the existence of long term relationships between banks
and customers, which are typical for a bank-based financial system as opposed to a market-based financial system,
see for example Fried and Howitt (1980) and Berger and Udell (1992).
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injections and examine their impact during crisis period.8
As this short review suggests, the existing literature on financial frictions and credit markets
is largely monetary in nature and is motivated to examine the impact of monetary policy on
macroeconomic fluctuations. However, as noted already, our focus is on the impact of credit shocks
on business cycle dynamics, and the role of bank credit in the transmission of technology shocks,
allowing for the possibility of firm defaults in the economy. One way to classify credit risks is to
make the distinction between microeconomic or idiosyncratic risks, which can be diversified away
through the law of large numbers, and macroeconomic or systematic risks, which cannot. Banks
generally have to deal with both types of risks. Freixas and Rochet (2008) argue that defining
and measuring credit risk is equivalent to determining how the market evaluates the probability
of default by a particular borrower, taking into account all the possibilities of diversification and
hedging provided by financial markets.
Our analysis is closely related to the modelling approaches of BGG and Christiano, Motto,
and Rostagno (2010).9 In BGG, entrepreneurial loans are risky and returns on the underlying
investments are subject to idiosyncratic and common shocks. A sufficiently unfavourable shock
can lead to the borrower’s bankruptcy. The idiosyncratic shock is observed by the entrepreneur,
but not by the bank which, as in Townsend (1979), must pay a fixed monitoring cost in order
to observe the entrepreneurs’ realised return. To mitigate problems stemming from this source
of asymmetric information, entrepreneurs and the bank sign a standard debt contract. Under
this contract, the entrepreneurs commits to paying back the loan principal and a interest charge,
unless it declares default. In case of default, the bank conducts a costly state verification of the
residual value of the entrepreneur’s assets and seizes the assets as a partial compensation. Our
paper differs from BGG in that the idiosyncratic shocks affect productivity rather than return on
capital in the economy, which keeps the model tractable and allows us to establish a direct link
between technology shocks and default probability.10 We also allow households to bear part of
the default risk through their equity investments in the firms, in the face of an adverse technology
shock, otherwise, the whole burden of default falls on the banking sector, resulting in unexpectedly
high spreads between loan and deposit rates. The default settlements and resource transfers in our
model will be discussed in details later.
2.2 Effects of technology shocks on hours and productivity
Although, the focus of our analysis is not on the effects of technology shocks, nevertheless it would
be of interest to compare our results on technology shocks with those reported in the literature.
In the standard RBC model, a positive technology shock results in a temporary rise in hours,
because the substitution effect due to higher wages and real interest rates outweighs the wealth
effect in the short run. However, as noted by Gali (1999), this prediction from the RBC model is
not in accordance with the empirical evidence. Using a structural VAR model, identified by means
8Several papers also explore the advantage of incorporating credit variables in the Taylor rule. Christiano, Ilut,
Motto, and Rostagno (2008) find that a Taylor rule that is modified to include a response to variations in some
measure of aggregate credit would be an improvement upon conventional policy advice. Curdia and Woodford
(2010) find that an adjustment for variations in credit spreads can improve upon the standard Taylor rule.
9Several other papers models firm defaults in a similar fashion, see for example Fiore and Tristani (2009).
10Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010) assume further that the variance of the idiosyncratic shock that hits
the entrepreneur’s return is the realisation of a time-varying process.
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of a long run restriction that only technology shock may have a permanent effect on the level of
productivity, Gali (1999) finds that hours decline in response to a positive technology shock, and
the estimates of the unconditional correlation of labour input (hours) and productivity are small
and slightly negative.
In a subsequent paper, Francis and Ramey (2005) assess the validity of the technology shocks
identified using long run restrictions in Gali (1999), by subjecting their model to a host of tests
which provide further support to Gali’s view. These papers have led to a lively debate on the
effects of technology shocks on hours. Francis and Ramey (2009) note that the key to the debate
lies in the data generating process assumed for per capital labour input in empirical models. When
per capita labour is treated as a unit root process and entered as first differences when estimating
a structural VAR, the results predict a fall in labour input in response to a positive shock to
technology. However, when per capita labour is treated as a stationary process and included in
levels when estimating a structural VAR, the results predict a rise in labour input following a
positive innovation in technology. Francis and Ramey (2009) conclude that after controlling for
low frequency components in hours to determine the effect of technology shocks, hours decline in
the short run in response to a positive technology shock. In a related paper, Canova, Lopez-Salido,
and Michelacci (2010) also find that once long cycles in hours are removed, hours robustly fall in
response to (neutral) technology shocks, and the percentage of the variation in hours explained by
the technology shock is small.11
In short, the empirical evidence as documented in the above studies shows that hours tend to fall
in response to a positive technology shock, however, this result contradicts standard RBC models
where a positive shock to technology is predicted to have a positive effect on all factor inputs. In an
attempt to reconcile the empirical evidence with RBC theoretical predictions, Gali (1999), Dotsey
(2002) and Basu, Fernald, and Kimball (2006) show that a model with monopolistic competition
and sticky prices can potentially explain the observed near zero unconditional correlation between
productivity and hours and a positive technology shock can lead to a decline in labour input. In
particular, Gali (1999) presents a sticky price model where a positive technology shock can lead
to a decline in labor input if the monetary authority is not too accommodative. In his example,
the combination of a constant money supply and predetermined prices implies that real balances
(and aggregate demand) remain unchanged in the period when the technology shock occurs. Each
firm will then meet its demand by producing an unchanged level of output. If the technology
shock is positive, producing the same output will require less labour input, and a decline in hours
will be observed. Furthermore, unchanged output and lower hours will lead to an increase in
measured labour productivity in response to the technology shock. In King and Wolman (1996) and
Dotsey (2002), a positive technology shock raises firms’ markup and the wedge between marginal
productivity of labour and real wage. Because the wedge is expected to decrease over time, real
wages are expected to rise in the future, so individuals reduce their labour supply in the short run
due to the intertemporal substitution effect.
Smets and Wouters (2007) and Francis and Ramey (2009) offer examples of flexible price models
that also imply a short run negative correlation between technology shocks and labour input. In a
flexible price model with habit formation in consumption and adjustment cost in investment, habit
11For additional empirical papers on the impact of technology shocks on labour hours and productivity, see for
example Alexius and Carlsson (2007) and Dedola and Neri (2007).
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persistence induces a sluggishness in the response of consumption. Consumers prefer not to change
their consumption by too much, while the high adjustment cost on investment makes investment
a relatively expensive good in the short run. As a result, the households spend the new wealth on
the only remaining alternative which is leisure and we observe a fall in hours following a positive
technology shock. The present paper provides an alternative explanation for the observed negative
effects of technology shocks on hours. This is achieved by using a non-separable utility function,
and by allowing a unit root in the technology process, and without the introduction of sticky price
and real frictions such as habit formation in consumption and adjustment cost in investment.
3 A Model of Credit and Default
We consider an economy comprised of a large number of firms, one representative household and a
competitive banking sector characterized by one representative bank. Firms are identical ex ante
and operate over a single period. At the beginning of each period, firms enter the market and decide
the optimal levels of labour and capital inputs, before the technology and credit shocks are realised.
The capital investment is financed by borrowing from the banking sector plus a capital injection
from the household at the start of the period. The funds invested by the household can be viewed
as “private equity”. Technology shocks then arrive and firms combine technology with capital and
labour to produce a single output. Firms may default if the technology shock is unfavourable,
such that the firm’s revenue is insufficient to repay its debt (principle and interest charges) to the
banking sector. We assume that the product market is fully competitive and while some firms may
fail each period, entry is free. The representative household consumes, receives interest payment
on their deposits held with the banks, wage payment for their labour services, and an ex post
lump-sum transfer (could be negative) from firms at the end of the period.12 The banking sector
takes deposits from the household at the beginning of the period, before the realisation of a credit
shock to the bank’s balance sheet that affects the supply of loanable funds available to the firms.
The banking sector receives interest and loan repayments from non-defaulted firms at the end of
the period and seizes upon the revenue (if any) of defaulted firms to partially cover its losses.
3.1 The household sector
For the household decision, we consider the following standard optimization problem
max
{Ct+j ,Nt+j ,j=0,1,2...}
E
 ∞∑
j=0
βjU(Ct+j , Nt+j)|Ωct
 , (3.1)
subject to the budget constraint
Dt+1 = (1 + rdt)Dt +WtNt − Ct − St + Πtc, (3.2)
where U(Ct, Nt) is the one period (instantaneous) utility function, Ct is the real consumption
expenditure, Nt is labour hours, and Wt is the real wage rate paid for household labour. Dt is
12Non-defaulted firms transfer any excess profits to the household sector. The transfer from defaulted firms can
be negative, depending on the realisation of technology shocks. Resource transfers and default settlements will be
discussed in details later.
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household’s holding of real deposits with the banking sector at the beginning of time t, rdt is
the real return on deposits in period t, which is known at time t. St is household’s real equity
investment (private equity) in the firms at the beginning of time t, and Πtc is the household’s lump-
sum transfer from firms, realised at the end of period t.13 Finally, β is the discount factor, where
0 < β < 1, and E (·|Ωct) denotes the mathematical conditional expectations operator with respect
to the non-decreasing information set Ωct, to be defined below. Note that we abstract from the
endogenous determination of equity holding for the household sector to keep the model tractable
and assume that the household supplies an amount of equity that is determined by an exogenous
leverage factor. As we shall see later, it is important to consider equity finance in addition to debt
finance in this model, otherwise we shall end up with excessively wide interest rate spreads and
unexpectedly high default probability.
We adopt the following specification of the utility function, popularized by Greenwood, Her-
cowitz, and Huffman (1988, pp.10),
U(Ct, Nt) =
1
1− γ
[(
Ct − χ0
1 + χ
N1+χt
)1−γ
− 1
]
, (3.3)
where γ > 0 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and 1/χ corresponds to the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution in labour supply, χ > 0. Following Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(1997, pp.1221), we have introduced a scaling parameter χ0 > 0 in (3.3), which is calibrated
with other model parameters.14 One important property of this form of utility function is that
the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labour effort only depends on labour
input, and technically this makes it easy to solve for Nt given the real wage:
−UN (Ct, Nt)
UC(Ct, Nt)
= χ0N
χ
t ,
so that labour effort is determined independently of the inter-temporal consumption–savings choice.
As we shall see later, this function implies a labour supply schedule that depends on the real wage
only and not on consumption.
The information set available to the household sector at the beginning of period t, Ωct can be
decomposed into a common component Ψt−1, and a private component Θct, which is made up of
information that is only known to the consumer at time t (but not necessarily to all the other
agents), Ωct = Ψt−1 ∪ Θct, where Θct = {Πtc,Πt−1,c, ...;St, St−1, ...;Ct;Dt+1, Dt;Wt;Nt; rdt}. The
common information set Ψt−1 is publicly available and will be specified later.
The solution to consumer’s optimisation problem is obtained using the first order conditions
with respect to Ct, Dt+1 and Nt. Specifically, we end up with (3.2) and the following equations:
E
β(Ct+1 − χ01+χN1+χt+1
Ct − χ01+χN1+χt
)−γ
(1 + rd,t+1)|Ωct
 = 1, (3.4)
Wt = χ0N
χ
t . (3.5)
13The implicit rate of return on household’s private equity investment is given by Πtc/St − 1.
14For other examples of this form of utility function, see Meng and Velasco (2003) and Chapter 3 of Heer and
Maussner (2005).
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3.2 Firms
3.2.1 Firm’s optimisation problem
Each firm i is endowed with the production technology
Yit = Z
ϕ
itNit
1−αKαit, for i = 1, 2, ..., n, (3.6)
where Kit and Nit are capital and labour inputs for firm i in period t, Yit is output for firm i in
period t, α is the share of capital, and ϕ is a constant to be determined subsequently.
The technology variable, Zit, is decomposed into an idiosyncratic component, Λit, and a com-
mon business cycle component, At. That is
Zit = ΛitAt. (3.7)
It is further assumed that
At = At−1 exp(µ+ ut), (3.8)
where ut is a serially correlated common technology shock that follows the first-order autoregressive
process
ut = ρuut−1 + εt, where εt ∼ N(0, σ2ε), and |ρu| < 1. (3.9)
The degree of serial correlation in the common technology shock, ut, is determined by the autore-
gressive parameter, ρu.
Let at = lnAt, then the business cycle component of the technology shock can be written as
at = at−1 + µ+ ρuut−1 + εt. (3.10)
Also let λit = ln Λit, and assume that λit is serially uncorrelated and independently and identically
distributed across firms, λit ∼ iid(0, σ2λ). Without loss of generality we also assume that εt and
λit are independently distributed. Then zit = lnZit = λit + at, can be viewed as a single factor
model where the common factor, at, is assumed to follow a unit root process. In this sense the
specification of technology is quite general and encompasses many other specifications entertained
in the theoretical macroeconomic literature.
Firms decide on capital and labour inputs before the arrival of the technology shock, Zit.
Further, part of the capital is financed through the equity investment from the household sector
at the beginning of each period, denoted by Sit, and the rest is borrowed from the banking sector,
Lit ≥ 0, namely
Kit = Lit + Sit. (3.11)
The consumer’s contribution to capital acquisition can be viewed as private equity investment with
possible gains/losses to be settled at the end of the period, once the shocks are realised. Note that
we assume that firms are owned by the household. From the household’s view point, the leverage
ratio of firm i is given by υi = Kit/Sit, and equation (3.11) imply that υi ≥ 1 for non-negative Lit.
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The share of capital financed by the banking sector is then given by
Lit =
(
υi − 1
υi
)
Kit. (3.12)
We assume that the firm leverage ratio is exogenously given and is time-invariant in this version
of the paper. It is easy to allow for time variation in υi, so long as it is assumed exogenous. An
endogenous formulation of the leverage ratio is also of interest but will not be attempted here, as
it falls outside the scope of the present paper.
Note that banks can not observe the idiosyncratic technology shocks Λit, as a result firms
are treated the same ex ante and receive an equal amount, Lit, from the banking sector. We also
assume that technology shock, Zit, is not known to firm i when choosing the optimal level of labour
and capital. The sequence of events are as follows: firms enter at the beginning of each period t,
with commitment from the household regarding private equity finance, borrow from the banking
sector, acquire capital, then technology shocks arrive, firms produce, sell output and pay wages to
the households. Firms either default or do not default depending on the size of technology shocks,
which we will discuss in details later.
Having the firms acquire their entire capital stock Kit at the beginning of each period t (together
with the assumption of full depreciation of capital) is a modelling device to ensure that firms are
identical ex ante in each period t. It will be also assumed that firms transfer any excess profits to
the household sector, so that a favourable technology shock to firm i at time t− 1 does not make
firm i better off at the beginning of time t, compared with the other firms. The one period nature
of the firms’ problem enables us to model firm defaults in a tractable manner.
For each firm i, Kit and Nit are derived by solving the following optimisation problem
max
{Ki,t+s,Ni,t+s,,s=0,1,2...}
E
( ∞∑
s=0
mt+sΠf,i,t+s|Ωf,it
)
, (3.13)
where Ωf,it is the information set available to firm i at the beginning of time t, mt+s is the stochastic
discount factor (under the assumption that the representative household owns the firms).15 The
firm’s profit function, Πf,it, is given by
Πf,it = Yit −WtNit − (1 + rkt)Kit,
where rkt is the real interest rate on capital in period t, which is known to the firm at the beginning
of time t and output Yit is given by equation (3.6).
Decompose the information set of firm i at the beginning of period t, Ωf,it into the common
component, Ψt−1, and a private (or firm-specific) component Θf,it. For each firm i, namely Ωf,it =
Ψt−1 ∪Θf,it, where Θf,it is given by
Θf,it = {Λit−1,Λit−2, ...;Yi,t−1, Yi,t−2, ...;Kit,Ki,t−1, ...;
Nit, Ni,t−1, ...;Lit, Li,t−1, ...;Wt; rlt; rkt; υi}.
The first order conditions for firm i’s optimisation problem yields the optimal levels of capital
15The stochastic discount factor associated with the household utility function is given by mt+s = β
s UC(Ct+s,Nt+s)
UC(Ct,Nt)
.
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and labour inputs and are given by
E
[
α (ΛitAt)
ϕ
(
Nit
Kit
)1−α
|Ωf,it
]
= 1 + rkt, (3.14)
E
[
(1− α) (ΛitAt)ϕ
(
Kit
Nit
)α
|Ωf,it
]
= Wt. (3.15)
These equations state that the expected marginal product of capital and labour are equal to the
return on capital and the wage rate, respectively.
Given the independence of λit and the innovation to at, we have
E(ΛϕitA
ϕ
t |Ωf,it) = E(eϕλit |Ωf,it)E(eϕat |Ωf,it).
Define the moment generating functions of λ and ε by Mλ(ϕ) = E(e
ϕλit |Ωf,it) and Mε(ϕ) =
E(eϕεt |Ωf,it) respectively, assuming Mλ(ϕ) and Mε(ϕ) exist. Using equations (3.10) and (3.14), it
can be shown that the optimal capital to labour ratio is identical for all firms, and is given by
Kit
Nit
=
(
αMλMε
1 + rkt
) 1
1−α
exp
[
ϕ(at−1 + µ+ ρuut−1)
1− α
]
, ∀ i, (3.16)
where we denote Mλ = Mλ(ϕ) and Mε = Mε(ϕ) to simplify the notation. Recall that we have
assumed firms to be identical ex ante, that is Nit and Kit are independent of i and only depend on
last period’s technology shock, since Nit and Kit are chosen before the realisation of this period’s
technology shock. In equilibrium we must have
Kit = Kt, Nit = Nt, Lit = Lt, υi = υ ∀ i, (3.17)
where Kt = m
−1Σmi=1Kit, Lt = m
−1Σmi=1Lit and Nt = m
−1Σmi=1Nit.
To determine the optimal level of capital and labour, respectively, note that equation (3.5) in
the household optimisation problem and the ratio between the first order conditions (3.14) and
(3.15) imply that
Kt =
αχ0
1− α ·
N1+χt
1 + rkt
. (3.18)
Using equations (3.16), (3.17) and (3.18), we also derive the following expression for optimal labour
hours
Nt =
[
1− α
αχ0
(αMλMε)
1
1−α (1 + rkt)
− α
1−α
] 1
χ
exp
[
ϕ(at−1 + µ+ ρuut−1)
χ(1− α)
]
. (3.19)
It is assumed that the rate of return on capital is identical to the rate of return on loans,
rkt = rlt. A wedge can be introduced between the two rates of returns by introducing information
asymmetries and monitoring costs. However, to keep the analysis simple and tractable, we abstract
from these complications.
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3.2.2 Firm’s default condition
We allow for the possibility of firm defaults in our model economy. Firm i is expected to default
if the technology shock to the ith firm is unfavourable, such that the value of the firm after wage
payments, which we take as Yit −WtNit (since price is normalised to 1) falls below a threshold
value determined by its callable liabilities, which we take as the repayment of loan RltLit, where
Rlt = 1 + rlt. See, for example, Merton (1974), and Pesaran, Schuermann, Treutler, and Weiner
(2006). Our set up avoids the need for collateral or monitoring by banks since all firms are ex
ante identical and the bank relies on diversification of idiosyncratic shocks across firms as a form
of insurance. The default condition is such that firm i defaults if and only if
Yit −WtNit < RltLit. (3.20)
To determine the probability of default, first define ζit = λit + εt, and note that under our
assumption ζit ∼ iid(0, σ2ζ ), where σ2ζ = σ2ε + σ2λ, and ζit has the following moment generating
function
Mζ = Mζ(ϕ) = E(e
ϕζit |Ωf,it) = MλMε.
Equations (3.5), (3.6), (3.12), (3.14), (3.17) and (3.18) imply that firm i defaults if and only if
eϕζit
Mζ
− (1− α)− α(1− 1
υ
) < 0, (3.21)
since Kit, 1 + rlt and α are positive. Alternatively the default condition can be written as
ζit <
ln
(
1− αυ
)
+ lnMζ
ϕ
≡ $1. (3.22)
Let dit denote the default indicator, defined as
dit = I(ζit < $1), (3.23)
where I(A) takes the value of unity if A holds or zero otherwise. Default occurs if the combined
technology shock (idiosyncratic and common) falls below a certain threshold $1, defined in (3.22),
which is common to all firms.
The probability of default depends on the probability distribution of ζit. Under the assumption
that the shocks are normally distributed we have
Mε = exp
(
ϕ2σ2ε
2
)
, Mλ = exp
(
ϕ2σ2λ
2
)
, Mζ = exp
(
ϕ2σ2ζ
2
)
, (3.24)
and the default probability is given by
κ = P (ζit < $1|Ωf,it) = Φ
[
ln
(
1− αυ
)
ϕσζ
+
ϕσζ
2
]
, (3.25)
where Φ (·) is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal.16 Under our assumptions
16The moment generating function of a random variable X is defined as MX(t) = E(e
tX), t ∈ R, wherever this
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the probability of default κ is time-invariant, but it is clear that time variation in κ can be allowed
for by introducing time variation in the volatility of technological shocks. This is in line with the
recent literature by Bloom (2009). The economy wide default probability is dependent on the
following deep structural parameters in the model: α, the share of capital; υ, the leverage ratio of
firms; ϕ, the exponent of technological process; and σζ , which depends on σε and σλ, the standard
deviation of common and idiosyncratic technology shocks, respectively.
The partial derivatives of κ, with respect to firm’s leverage factor υ and the standard deviation
of the combined technology shocks σζ are given by
∂κ
∂υ
=
α
ϕσζυ(υ − α) · φ
[
ln
(
1− αυ
)
ϕσζ
+
ϕσζ
2
]
> 0, (3.26)
∂κ
∂σζ
=
[
− ln
(
1− αυ
)
ϕσ2ζ
+
ϕ
2
]
· φ
[
ln
(
1− αυ
)
ϕσζ
+
ϕσζ
2
]
> 0, (3.27)
since the density function of a standard normal distribution φ(·) is positive, the firm’s leverage
factor υ is greater than and equal to 1 (and therefore α), ln
(
1− αυ
)
< 0 and the parameters α, ϕ
and σζ are positive. Therefore, the default probability rises with υ, as firms become more leveraged
and dependent on bank finance; and also rises with the volatility of combined technology shocks,
σζ , as to be expected.
3.2.3 Resource transfers and default settlements
Two cases can arise after the realisation of technology shocks:
Outcome 1: Firm i does not default (Yit −WtNit −RltLit > 0). As we have shown earlier,
Yit − WtNit − RltLit > 0 if and only if ζit > $1, which occurs with probability 1 − κ. When
firm i does not default, the bank is repaid the principal and interest on the loan, RltLit, and the
household receives a non-negative transfer from firms after wage payment:
Πi,tc = Yit −WtNit −RltLit > 0, if firm i does not default,
Πi,tb = RltLit, if firm i does not default.
Πi,tc is the compensation received by the household for its equity investment in the non-defaulted
firm i.
Outcome 2: Firm i defaults (Yit −WtNit − RltLit < 0). When firm i defaults, it is unable
to repay RltLit to the banking sector. The bank instead seizes the revenue of the defaulted firm
after wage payments if this value (Yit −WtNit) is positive, otherwise the bank gets no payment.
The household bears the rest of default losses and receives zero or negative transfer from the firms
after wage payment. More specifically,
Πi,tc = Min(0, Yit −WtNit), if firm i defaults,
Πi,tb = Max(0, Yit −WtNit), if firm i defaults.
expectation exists. For a log-normal distribution where lnx ∼ N(µ, σ2), all moments exist and E(x) = eµ+σ
2
2 .
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Depending on the realisation of technology shocks, there are two outcomes to distinguish. In the
first subcase, firm i defaults and the transfer to the household is negative (Yit −WtNit < 0), in
effect, the household does not receive full wage payment.
Using equations (3.5), (3.6), (3.14), (3.17) and (3.18), we have the condition that Yit−WtNit < 0
if and only if
eϕζit
Mζ
− (1− α) < 0, (3.28)
since Kit, Rlt and α are positive, which in logarithm is given by
ζit <
ln(1− α)
ϕ
+
ϕσ2ζ
2
≡ $2.
The probability τ that the household receives a negative transfer is therefore
τ = P (ζit < $2|Ωf,it) = Φ
[
ln(1− α)
ϕσζ
+
ϕσζ
2
]
, (3.29)
which is independent of i and t. The household and the bank receive a negative and zero transfer
from the firms, respectively, where Πi,tc = Yit −WtNit < 0 and Πi,tb = 0.
In the second subcase, firm i defaults and the revenue generated is sufficient to cover wage
payments, (0 < Yit −WtNit < RltLit). This scenario arises if and only if the combined technology
shock, ζit, lies within the range given by $2 < ζit < $1,with probability κ − τ. The household
receives zero transfer after the wage payment and the bank seizes the revenue of the defaulted firm
after wage payments, where Πi,tc = 0 and Πi,tb = Yit −WtNit > 0.
3.2.4 Aggregation
To study the equilibrium conditions of the aggregate model economy, we consider the cross sectional
average of firm output, defined by
Yt =
∑m
i=1 Yit
m
=
(∑m
i=1 e
ϕλit
m
)
Aϕt Nt
1−αKαt .
But since, λit are assumed to be identically and indepednetly distributed and E(e
ϕλit) exists, then
by law of large numbers we have∑m
i=1 e
ϕλit
m
p→ Ec(eϕλit) = Mλ(ϕ) = Mλ,
where Ec(e
ϕλit) is the cross section expectation of eϕλit . Therefore, aggregate output is given by17
Yt = MλA
ϕ
t Nt
1−αKαt . (3.30)
Recall that the household and banking sector receive a transfer from the firms after production,
the amount of which depends on the realisation of technology shocks. Denote Πtc the average
17It is relatively easy to allow Mλ to be time-varying.
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transfer to the household and Πtb the average transfer to the banking sector, we have
Yt −WtNt = Πtc + Πtb, (3.31)
where Πtc and Πtb comprise of payoff from both defaulted and non-defaulted firms
Πtc =
∑m
i=1(1− dit)(Yit −WtNit −RltLit) +
∑m
i=1 ditMin(0, Yit −WtNit)
m
(3.32)
Πtb =
∑m
i=1 ditMax(0, Yit −WtNit) +
∑m
i=1(1− dit)LitRlt
m
. (3.33)
We evaluate Πtc in equation (3.32) by first noting that Min(0, Yit −WtNit) can be written in
terms of the following indicator function
Min(0, Yit −WtNit)
= I(ζit < $2) · (Yit −WtNit) + I($2 < ζit < $1) · 0.
Recall that dit = I(ζit < $1), therefore
ditMin(0, Yit −WtNit) = I(ζit < $2) · (Yit −WtNit).
By the law of large number, for large m,∑m
i=1 dit
m
p→ Ec(dit) = κ ∀ i and t,
where κ is the probability of default.
The average output of the defaulted firms can be expressed as∑m
i=1 ditYit
m
=
∑m
i=1 dite
ϕλit
m
Aϕt Nt
1−αKαt .
Note also dit = I(λit + εt < $1) = I(λit < $1 − εt). By the law of large number,∑m
i=1 e
ϕλitI(λit < $1 − εt)
m
p→
∫ $1−εt
−∞
eϕxfλ(x)dx, as m→∞,
where fλ(x) is the probability density function of λit.
Lemma 1 In the case where λit/σλ ∼ N(0, 1), and hence fλ(x) = φ(x/σλ) is the normal density,
we have ∫ $1−εt
−∞
eϕxfλ(x)dx = Mλς1(εt),
where Mλ is given by (3.24) and
ς1(εt) = Φ
(
$1 − εt − σ2λϕ
σλ
)
. (3.34)
Proof. See appendix A.
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Following from Lemma 1, for large m,∑m
i=1 ditYit
m
p→Mλς1(εt)Aϕt Nt1−αKαt = ς1(εt)Yt.
Finally, using the law of large number and Lemma 1, it can be shown that∑m
i=1 I(ζit < $2)
m
p→ τ,∑m
i=1 I(λit < $2 − εt)Yit
m
p→ ς2(εt)Yt,
where τ is given by (3.29) and
ς2(εt) = Φ
(
$2 − εt − σ2λϕ
σλ
)
. (3.35)
The transfer of resources from firms to the household sector, Πtc, and the banking sector, Πtb,
are therefore given by
Πtc = [1− ς1(εt)]Yt − (WtNt +RltLt)(1− κ) + ς2(εt)Yt − τWtNt, (3.36)
Πtb = RltLt(1− κ)− (κ− τ)WtNt + [ς1(εt)− ς2(εt)]Yt, (3.37)
where Yt, κ, ς1(εt) and ς2(εt)are given in (3.30), (3.25), (3.34) and (3.35), respectively.
3.3 The banking sector
The banking sector acts as the financial intermediary between the household and the firms. It
receives deposit, Dt, from the household at the beginning of time t and channels household deposits
to loans, Lt, extended to the firms. We postulate the relationship between Lt and Dt by
Lt = θtDt, (3.38)
where θt is assumed to be exogenously given. Equation (3.38) allows us to introduce shocks that
originate on the supply side of credit and to study their propagation to the real economy, in a
tractable manner.
One interpretation of (3.38), is that the banking sector is required to deposit some reserves,
Bt, with the central bank, through which the central bank is able to influence the amount of bank
credit available in the economy (see for example the bank balance sheet in Freixas and Rochet,
2008). Then Lt+Bt = Dt, where Bt = (1−θt)Dt. The purpose of compulsory reserve requirement
as a policy instrument can be two fold. When the economy is overheating and the level of fixed
investment is high, central bank can raise reserve ratio (1−θt) to curb credit expansion and reduce
the inflationary pressure in the economy, in which case reserve requirement acts as a counter-
cyclical policy tool. Alternatively, it could be that, when lending risk is high (for example, owing
to an increase in firm default probability), the central bank may raise the reserve requirement ratio,
so that the banking sector puts aside sufficient amount of reserve to cushion the impact of higher
bank losses due to firm defaults. Part of Bt could also be viewed as bank capital required by the
regulatory authority. The importance of bank capital has been highlighted in the recent financial
18
crisis and the debate on Basel III capital regulation to improve capital adequacy in the banking
sector.18 In the United States, the capital requirement of Tier 1 capital is typically set to be at
least 5 to 6%. In both cases of capital requirement or reserve requirement, θt will be below 1.
However, one could also consider the case where θt is greater than 1. This is possible when banks
are allowed to issue securities (IOUs) without being backed by deposits, which could potentially
be guaranteed by the central bank in case of a bank run (not modelled in our framework). The
central bank can also be a source of additional liquidity to the banking sector, as seen in the recent
financial crisis. To model this possibility explicitly, one would need to introduce price level and
inflation in our framework, as central bank credit provision could lead to inflationary pressure in the
economy. Given the relatively simple and canonical characterisation of the banking sector in our
model, we abstract from pinpointing the exact source of the credit shock, instead, we investigate
all three different scenarios where the mean of θt, denoted by µθ below, is less than, equal to and
greater than unity in our calibration and simulation exercises later.
For the banking sector to be solvent, the following condition must be satisfied: the end of
period asset position of the banking sector must be greater or equal to the liabilities of the banking
sector. Assume that the banking sector makes zero profit and in equilibrium
(1 + rdt)Dt = Πtb, (3.39)
where Πtb, the transfer from firms comprises of loan repayment from solvent firms and the confis-
cation of assets of defaulted firms, is given by equation (3.37).
The exogenous process for the loan to deposit ratio, θt, is assumed to follow
ln θt = ρθ ln θt−1 + ηt, (3.40)
where |ρθ| < 1, and ηt ∼ N(µη, σ2η). The distribution of ln θt is therefore given by ln θt ∼
N(
µη
1−ρθ ,
σ2η
1−ρ2θ
). Using the properties of log-normal distribution, we have
E(θt) = E(e
ln θt) = exp
(
µη
1− ρθ +
1
2
σ2η
1− ρ2θ
)
= µθ,
where µθ is the mean of the loan to deposit ratio. µη and E(lnθt) can be expressed in terms of µθ,
ση and ρθ, as follows
µη = (1− ρθ)ln (µθ)− 1
2
σ2η
1 + ρθ
, (3.41)
E(lnθt) = ln (µθ)− 1
2
σ2η
1− ρ2θ
. (3.42)
Finally, for completeness, the information set for the bank Ωbt can be written as Ωbt = Ψt−1 ∪
Θbt, where Θbt contains information that is known to the bank at the beginning of time t and
Θbt = {Πtb,Πt−1,b, ...; rdt; rlt;Lt;Dt; θt}. As in Binder and Pesaran (1998, 2001), Ψt−1 is a common
information set, containing all the publicly available information at the beginning of period t that
18For a discussion on bank capital requirement and risk management, see for example Pelizzon and Schaefer (2007).
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is common to the consumer, firms and the bank.
Ψt−1 = {Ct−1,Ct−2, ...;Kt−1,Kt−2, ...;Yt−1, Yt−2, ...;Lt−1,Lt−2, ...;Dt−1, Dt−2, ...;
Nt−1, Nt−2, ...;Wt−1,Wt−2, ...; rd,t−1, rd,t−2, ...; rl,t−1, rl,t−2, ...; εt−1, εt−2,...;
θt−1, θt−2, ...}.
4 Short Run Equilibrium Conditions and Long Run Steady States
4.1 Equilibrium conditions
The complete set of equations that characterize the equilibrium conditions of the model is given
by equations (3.2), (3.4), (3.5), (3.18), (3.19), (3.30), (3.31), (3.37), (3.38), (3.39) and the aggre-
gate version of equations (3.11) and (3.12). We set out below the key equations of the complete
macroeconomic framework again for convenience,
1 = E
β(Ct+1 − χ01+χN1+χt+1
Ct − χ01+χN1+χt
)−γ
Rd,t+1|Ωct
 , (4.1)
Wt = χ0N
χ
t , (4.2)
Dt+1 = RdtDt +WtNt − Ct − St + Πtc, (4.3)
Kt =
αχ0
1− α ·
N1+χt
Rlt
, (4.4)
Nt =
[
1− α
αχ0
(αMλMε)
1
1−α
] 1
χ
(Rlt)
− α
(1−α)χ exp
[
ϕ(at−1 + µ+ ρuut−1)
χ(1− α)
]
, (4.5)
Yt = MλA
ϕ
t Nt
1−αKαt , (4.6)
Lt = (1− 1
υ
)Kt, (4.7)
Πtb = RdtDt, (4.8)
Kt = Lt + St, (4.9)
Lt = θtDt, (4.10)
Πtb = RltLt(1− κ)− (κ− τ)WtNt + ς(εt)Yt, (4.11)
Πtc = Yt −WtNt −Πtb, (4.12)
where
κ = Φ
(
$1
σζ
)
, τ = Φ
(
$2
σζ
)
, ς(εt) = ς1(εt)− ς2(εt),
ς1(εt) = Φ
(
$1 − εt − σ2λϕ
σλ
)
, ς2(εt) = Φ
(
$2 − εt − σ2λϕ
σλ
)
,
$1 =
ln
(
1− αυ
)
ϕ
+
ϕσ2ζ
2
, $2 =
ln(1− α)
ϕ
+
ϕσ2ζ
2
,
Mλ = exp
(
ϕ2σ2λ
2
)
, M = exp
(
ϕ2σ2
2
)
,
Rlt = 1 + rlt and Rdt = 1 + rdt.
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There are 12 equations governing the macro economy, (4.1) to (4.12) in 12 endogenous variables
Ct, Wt, Nt, Dt, St, Lt, Kt, Yt, Πtb, Πtc, Rdt and Rlt. The model is subject to two exogenously
determined processes, the technological process, at, and the credit shock to θt, governed by
at = at−1 + µ+ ut, where ut = ρuut−1 + εt, (4.13)
ln θt = ρθ ln θt−1 + ηt. (4.14)
Combining equations (4.3), (4.8) and (4.12) to obtain the economy wide budget constraint in
our model
Yt − Ct = St +Dt+1, (4.15)
which shows the composition of output net of consumption (savings) is in the form of ‘private
equity’ investment, St, and deposits, Dt+1.
From simulation exercises, we found that ς(εt) is very small for reasonable parameter values of
α, υ, χ, σ2ε and σ
2
λ. As a result, we approximate equation (4.11) by the following expression
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Πtb = RltLt(1− κ)− (κ− τ)WtNt.
We assume that a central planner with a common information set Ωt solves the system of
equilibrium conditions. The common information set Ωt which is known to the planner at time t
is defined by
Ωt = Ψt−1 ∪Θbt ∪Θct ∪ (∪mi=1Θf,it) .
Note that the variables Ct, Dt+1, Lt, Kt, St, Nt, Wt, Rdt, Rlt, Yt, Πtc, Πtb, υ, θt and εt are included
in the planner’s information set Ωt at time t.
4.2 Derivation of steady states
Since this model depicts a growing economy where the technological process, at, contains a unit
root as well as a deterministic growth component, µ, we must scale the endogenous variables Ct,
Lt, Dt, St, Kt, Wt, Nt and Yt in the system of equilibrium conditions by an appropriate factor of
technology, At−1, so that the transformed variables are stationary on a balanced growth path, to
guarantee that the model possesses steady states. We shall also assume that the real interest rates
are stochastically bounded (bounded in probability), that is Rlt = Op(1) and Rdt = Op(1), which
is in line with the empirical evidence on US real interest rates series.20
Proposition 1 To guarantee the existence of steady states in the economy defined by equations
(4.1) to (4.12), and the processes of the exogenous variables given in equations (4.13) and (4.14),
the exponent of the technology process, Zit, in the firm’s production function (3.6) must be restricted
as
ϕ =
(1− α)χ
1 + χ
. (4.16)
19Under the baseline parametrisation of the model, the average value of ς(εt) is very small, at an average value of
0.0062 for 100, 000 simulations.
20Boundedness in Probability is defined as follows: We say that the sequence Xn is bounded in probability, written
Xn = Op(1), if for every ε > 0 there exists δ(ε) ∈ (0,∞) such that Pr [|Xn| > δ(ε)] < ε for all n.
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Proof. First note that (4.5) can be rewritten as
Nt =
[
1− α
αχ0
(αMλMε)
1
1−α
] 1
χ
(Rlt)
− α
(1−α)χ
[
A
ϕ
(1−α)χ
t−1
]
exp
[
ϕ(µ+ ρuut−1)
χ(1− α)
]
. (4.17)
On the assumption that real interest rates are bounded in probability and ut is stationary, we have
Nt = Op
[
A
ϕ
(1−α)χ
t−1
]
. (4.18)
Now scaling Kt by At−1, and equation (4.4) becomes
Kt
At−1
=
(
αχ0
1− α
)
N1+χt A
−1
t−1
Rlt
(4.19)
Therefore, to ensure that KtAt−1 is bounded in probability, (4.19) implies that
Nt = Op
(
A
1
1+χ
t−1
)
. (4.20)
But for results (4.18) and (4.20) to be compatible, we must have the condition ϕ(1−α)χ =
1
1+χ or
ϕ = (1−α)χ1+χ , as required.
Remark 1 The expressions for the endogenous variables (except for the interest rates) in efficiency
units are given by C˚t =
Ct
At−1 , L˚t =
Lt
At−1 , S˚t =
St
At−1 , D˚t =
Lt
At−1 , K˚t =
Kt
At−1 , W˚t =
Wt
A
χ/(1+χ)
t−1
,
N˚t =
Nt
A
1/(1+χ)
t−1
and Y˚t =
Yt
At−1 . In particular, equation (4.2) implies Wt = χ0N
χ
t = Op(A
χ
1+χ
t−1 ), which
implies that Wt must be scaled by A
χ
1+χ
t−1 , to ensure that W˚t is Op(1).
Define the growth rate of technology by
gt =
eat
eat−1
= eµ+ut = (1 + g)eut , (4.21)
where ut = ρut−1 + εt and eµ ≡ 1 + g.
The standard macro models assume that all shocks are equal to zero in the steady state analysis,
and in effect, abstract from any possible non-linearities in the steady state relations of the model.
We propose an alternative method where the steady state relations of the model are derived from
unconditional expectations of the model’s relations in terms of the variables measured in efficiency
units. Using this approach, We are able to express the steady state of shocks as a function of their
mean and standard deviation, hence allowing for explicit consideration of risks in the steady state.
Denote the natural logarithm of the variables by lower case letters, that is c˚t = lnC˚t, denote the
variables in steady state by the lower case letters with a star, for example, the steady state of log
consumption in efficiency units is given by c˚∗ = E(lnC˚t). Note also that lnRlt = ln(1 + rlt) ≈ rlt
and lnRdt ≈ rdt.
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The steady state of the system of equilibrium conditions are therefore given by21
E(lnθt) + d˚
∗ = lnχ0 + ln
[
α(1− 1υ )
1− α
]
+ (1 + χ)˚n∗ − r∗l , (4.22)
n˚∗ = − lnχ0
χ
+
1
χ
ln
[
1− α
α
(αMλMε)
1
1−α
]
+
µ
1 + χ
− α
(1− α)χr
∗
l , (4.23)
y˚∗ = ln
[
Mλ
(1− 1υ )α
]
+ ϕµ+ (1− α)˚n∗ + αE(lnθt) + αd˚∗, (4.24)
ey˚
∗ − ec˚∗ = ed˚∗+µ + 1
υ − 1e
E(lnθt)+d˚∗ , (4.25)
r∗d = γµ− lnβ, (4.26)
er
∗
d+d˚
∗
= er
∗
l +E(lnθt)+d˚
∗
(1− κ)− χ0(κ− τ)e(1+χ)˚n
∗
, (4.27)
where α, υ, χ, µ, β, γ and χ0 are parameters of the model, which will be calibrated at a later stage.
Mλ and Mε are defined in (3.24), κ and τ are given by equations (3.25) and (3.29), respectively,
E(lnθt) is given by equation (3.42), and ϕ must satisfy equation (4.16) in Proposition 1.
4.3 Log-linearisation
Consistent with the above derivation of steady states, we log-linearise the system of equilibrium
equations around the log steady state values obtained by solving (4.22) to (4.27). Denote the log
deviations from the steady state as ˜˚ct = c˚t − c˚∗, where c˚t = ln C˚t. Then
C˚t = e
c˚t ≈ ec˚∗ + ec˚∗ (˚ct − c˚∗) = ec˚∗(1 + ˜˚ct).
Also l˜n gt = ln gt − E (ln gt) , where using (4.21) we have ln gt = µ + ut. Hence, l˜n gt = ut =
ρuut−1 + εt. Similarly, for the logarithm of the loan to deposit ratio, l˜n θt = ln θt − E(lnθt),
and since ln θt = ρθ ln θt−1 + ηt, then l˜n θt = ρθ l˜n θt−1 + η˜t, where η˜t = ηt − (1 − ρθ)E(lnθt).
However, using (3.42), and recalling that by assumption η˜t ∼ N(µη, σ2η), it then readily follows
that, η˜t ∼ N(0, σ2η).
The log-linearised approximation of the equilibrium conditions of the model are therefore given
by22
˜˚ct − a1˜˚nt = E (˜˚ct+1 − a1˜˚nt+1 − a3r˜d,t+1|Ωct)+ a2ut, (4.28)
−˜˚ct + (1 + a4 + a6)˜˚yt − a6˜˚dt+1 = a4˜˚dt + a6ut + a4 l˜n θt, (4.29)˜˚nt + α
(1− α)χr˜lt =
ρu
1 + χ
ut−1, (4.30)
r˜dt − r˜lt = l˜nθt, (4.31)˜˚yt − (1 + αχ) ˜˚nt + αr˜lt = ϕut, (4.32)
(1 + χ) ˜˚nt − r˜lt = ˜˚dt + l˜n θt, (4.33)
21The detailed derivation of the steady state conditions can be found in Appendix B.
22Note that E (ut|Ωct) = ut. The derivation of the log-linearised approximation of the equilibrium conditions can
be found in Appendix B.
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where
a1 = b1(1 + χ), a2 = 1− b1, a3 = 1− b1
γ
,
a4 =
1
υ − 1e
E(lnθt)+d˚∗−c˚∗ , a6 = ed˚
∗+µ−c˚∗ , b1 =
χ0
1 + χ
e(1+χ)˚n
∗−c˚∗ .
There are 6 equations as set out in (4.28) to (4.33) for 6 endogenous variables: ˜˚ct, ˜˚dt, ˜˚yt, ˜˚nt,
r˜dt and r˜lt, which are all known to the planner at time t.
4.4 Model solution
We use the quadratic determinantal equation (QDE) approach of Binder and Pesaran (1995, 1997)
to solve the rational expectations equations given by (4.28) to (4.33). Let xt = (˜˚ct,
˜˚
dt+1, r˜lt, r˜dt,˜˚yt, ˜˚nt)′, and write the above system of equations as
H0xt = H1xt−1 + H2E(xt+1|Ωt) + vt, (4.34)
where
vt = G˜0ξt + G˜1ξt−1, ξt =
(
ut
l˜n θt
)
, (4.35)
and
ξt = Rξt−1 +ψt, R =
(
ρu 0
0 ρθ
)
, ψt =
(
εt
η˜t
)
, (4.36)
with εt ∼ N(0, σ2ε), and η˜t ∼ N(0, σ2η).
The matrices H0, H1, H2, G˜0 and G˜1 are given by
H0 =

1 0 0 0 0 −a1
−1 −a6 0 0 1 + a4 + a6 0
0 0 α(1−α)χ 0 0 1
0 0 −1 1 0 0
0 0 α 0 1 − (1 + αχ)
0 0 −1 0 0 (1 + χ)

, H1 =

0 0 0 0 0 0
0 a4 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0

,
H2 =

1 0 0 −a3 0 −a1
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0

, G˜0 =

a2 0
a6 a4
0 0
0 1
ϕ 0
0 1

, G˜1 =

0 0
0 0
ρu
1+χ 0
0 0
0 0
0 0

, xt =

˜˚ct˜˚
dt+1
r˜lt
r˜dt˜˚yt˜˚nt

.
Note that ψt is a serially uncorrelated vector process with zero mean. Note also that H0 is non-
singular, and (4.34) can be written as (using equation (4.35))
xt = H
−1
0 H1xt−1 + H
−1
0 H2E(xt+1|Ωt) + H−10 G˜0ξt + H−10 G˜1ξt−1,
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or
xt = Axt−1 + BE(xt+1|Ωt) + G0ξt + G1ξt−1, (4.37)
where A = H−10 H1, B = H
−1
0 H2, G0 = H
−1
0 G˜0, and G1 = H
−1
0 G˜1.
The rational expectations solution of (4.37) is given by23
xt = Cxt−1 + D0ξt + D1ξt−1, (4.38)
where
BC2−C + A = 0, (4.39)
D1 = (I−BC)−1G1, (4.40)
(I−BC)D0 −BD0R = G0 + B(I−BC)−1G1. (4.41)
Following Binder and Pesaran (1995, 1997), we use the quadratic difference equation (QDE) in
(4.39) to solve for C. After obtaining C, (4.40) can be used to obtain D1. To solve for D0, first
write equation (4.41) as
D0 −Q0D0R = Q1, (4.42)
where
Q0 = (I−BC)−1 B,
Q1 = (I−BC)−1 G0 + (I−BC)−1 B(I−BC)−1G1.
Then using results in Magnus and Neudecker (1988) (pp. 30-31),
vec(D0)−
(
R′ ⊗Q0
)
vec(D0) = vec (Q1) ,
which yields
vec(D0) =
[
I− (R′ ⊗Q0)]−1 vec (Q1) .
4.5 Impulse responses
In our simulation exercises, we are interested in the impact of (1) a positive technology shock and (2)
a positive credit shock on business cycle dynamics, assuming that the two shocks are uncorrelated
for identification purposes. We compute the impulse responses to credit and technology shocks
following Koop, Pesaran, and Potter (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998), as the generalised impulse
response functions offer more modelling flexibility and can easily allow for non-zero correlation
between the credit and technology shocks if required.
Definition 1 The “generalised impulse response function”(GIRF) of a vector process xt of dimen-
sion p× 1 is defined by
GIx(h, δ,Ωt−1) = E(xt+h|ψt = δ,Ωt−1)− E(xt+h|Ωt−1),
23The proof that (4.38) is indeed a solution to (4.37) is given in the Appendix B.
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where Ωt−1 is the common information set at time t− 1, and δ is a vector of shocks.
Recall that model solutions are given by equation (4.38). Using definition 1 of GIRFs and
denoting GIx(h, δ,Ωt−1) by GIx(h) for simplicity, we have:
GIx(h) = CGIx(h− 1) + D0GIξ(h) + D1GIξ(h− 1), for h = 0, 1, 2, 3...,
GIξ(h) = RGIξ(h− 1), for h = 1, 2, 3...,
GIx(h) = 0, for h < 0, and GIξ(h) = 0, for h < 0.
For the technology shock on impact, we have
GIξ(0) = GIψ(0) =
1√
e′1Cov(ψt)e1
Cov(ψt)e1 , (4.43)
where e1 = (1, 0)
′ and
Cov(ψt) =
(
σ2ε ρεησεση
ρεησεση σ
2
η
)
.
To obtain the GIRFs for the credit shock, we need to replace e1 in (4.43) by e2 = (0, 1)
′. In the
standard case where technology and credit shocks are assumed to be uncorrelated, we have
Cov(ψt) =
(
σ2ε 0
0 σ2η
)
,
and (4.43) can be simplified such that GIξ(0) = (σε, 0)
′ for a one standard deviation positive shock
to technology, and GIξ(0) = (0, ση)
′ for a one standard deviation positive shock to credit.
Also, recalling that Lt = θtDt, then
˜˚
lt = l˜n θt +
˜˚
dt, and the GIRF of
˜˚
lt is given by
GIl(h) = GIln θ(h) +GId(h− 1),
where GIln θ(h) is defined by the second element of GIξ(h), or (0, 1)GIξ(h), and GId(h−1) is given
by the second element of GIx(h).
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In log-linearised form, labour productivity is given by p˜rodt =
˜˚yt− ˜˚nt, and therefore, the GIRF
for p˜rodt can be computed as
GIprod(h) = GIy(h)−GIn(h),
where GIy(h) and GIn(h) are given by the fifth and the sixth elements of GIx(h), respectively.
Proposition 2 Under the system of equilibrium conditions set out in equations (4.28) to (4.33),
and assuming that credit and technology shocks are uncorrelated, it follows that:
(a) A technology shock has no impact, at any horizon, on the spread between loan and deposit rates,
r˜lt − r˜dt.
(b) A credit shock has a negative impact on the interest rate spread, r˜lt − r˜dt.
(c) The level of labour hours and loan rate respond in opposite directions following a credit shock.
24Note that the second element of GIx(h) refers to the GIRF of
˜˚
dt+1, which is given by GId(h), and hence the
associate GIRF for
˜˚
dt is GId(h− 1).
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(d) Output responds positively to a technology shock on impact, but falls consequently if labour
hours fall and loan rate rises following a positive technology shock.
Proof. The impulse responses implied by equations (4.30), (4.31) and (4.32) can be written as
GIn(h) +
α
(1− α)χGIrl (h) =
ρu
1 + χ
GIu(h− 1), (4.44)
GIr
d
(h)−GIr
l
(h) = GIlnθ(h), (4.45)
GIy(h)− (1 + αχ)GIn(h) + αGIr
l
(h) = ϕGIu(h). (4.46)
Results (a) and (b) follow from equation (4.45), which shows that the impulse response of the
interest rate spread does not depend on the technology shock. This equation also establishes that
a credit shock has a negative impact on the interest rate spread. Result (c) follows from equation
(4.44), where GIn(h) +
α
(1−α)χGIrl (h) = 0, following a credit shock. Finally, (4.46) implies that
technology shock leads to a positive response in output on impact, however, one should expect a
negative correction in the responses in output if labour hours respond negatively and loan rate
responds positively to a technology shock, as stated in result (d).
5 Parameter Calibration
Following much of the literature, the capital share, α, is set to 0.35, the discount rate r to 1.6% per
annum (0.4% per quarter) which gives β = 0.996. Following Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman
(1988), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1997) and as is standard in business cycle analysis,
γ, the coefficient of risk aversion, is set to 1. For 1/χ, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
in labour supply, Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman (1988) argue that for a representative
household, 1/χ should summarize the variation in labour of all members of such a unit, both at
the intensive and extensive margins. These authors suggest that a reasonable value of 1/χ should
lie in the range {0.3 − 2.2}. In our calibrated exercise we select a mid point value in this range
and set 1/χ = 1.4, or χ = 0.7. The scaling parameter, χ0, in (3.3) is chosen such that, the steady
state value of labour hours in efficiency units is set to unity, namely N˚∗ = en˚∗ = 1.
The remaining parameters, ρu, σε, µ, υ, ρθ and ση are calibrated using US quarterly time
series data covering the period 1985Q1 to 2009Q4.25 Following the literature, we use the Hodrick-
Prescott (1997) filter to extract the cyclical components from the data series, with a smoothing
parameter value of 1600, which is recommended for quarterly data.26 To derive the standard
deviation of common technology shock, σε, from US data, we first detrend the log of per capital
real output series. The standard deviation of the cyclical component (as proxy for the innovation
to common technology shock, εt) is found to be 0.011, similar to the value used in Romer (2006).
The deterministic trend in technology growth µ is obtained by calculating the mean of the growth
rate of per capita real GDP in logarithm in the US between 1985Q1 and 2009Q4. µ is found to
25A detailed description of the US data series used for calibration can be found in Appendix C.
26The HP filter was introduced in Hodrick and Prescott (1980) and discussed in King and Rebelo (1993) and
Hodrick and Prescott (1997). The cyclical component yct of the series extracted by an HP filter, is defined by (in the
infinite sample version of the HP filter) yct =
λ(1−L)2(1−L−1)2
1+λ(1−L)2(1−L−1)2 yt, where yt is the original time series, L is the lag
operator and λ is the smoothing parameter. Alternative approaches for permanent–transitory decomposition include
the Beveridge-Nelson procedure (see for example Garratt, Lee, Pesaran, and Shin, 2006).
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Table 1: Model Parameters
Preference Value Source
γ coefficient of risk aversion 1 Christiano et al. (1997)
χ inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of 0.7 Greenwood et al. (1988)
substitution in labour supply
β discount factor 0.996
Technology
ρu coefficient of autoregression in common 0.439 US data
technology shock
σε standard deviation of common 0.011 US data
technology shock
µ deterministic trend in technology growth 0.003 US data
Production and firm financing
α share of capital 0.35 BGG
υ firm’s leverage factor 1.43 US data
κ probability of default 0.086 Moody (2010) and BGG
Credit
ρθ coefficient of autoregression in 0.848 US data
credit shock
ση standard deviation of credit shock 0.011 US data
µθ mean of loan to deposit ratio 0.95, 1, 1.05
be around 0.003, which implies a per capita output growth rate of around 1.2%, per annum. The
autoregressive coefficient of the growth rate of per capita real GDP (in logarithm) is 0.439, which is
taken as the coefficient of autoregression in common technology shock, ρu. To match an annualised
default probability of around 3.4% (quarterly rate of 0.86%), consistent with BGG and the rolling
12-month US private firm quarterly default rate provided by Moody from 2000 to 2009, we set the
standard deviation of idiosyncratic technology shock, σλ, to 0.43.
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We calibrate the values for the standard deviation and the autoregressive coefficient of the
credit shock using US data on loans and deposits between 1985Q1 to 2009Q4. First, we define
a series that is the difference between the logarithm of per capita loans and the logarithm of per
capita deposits. We then detrend the series using a HP filter (with the smoothing parameter of
1600), and take the cyclical components of the series as a proxy for ηt. The standard deviation of
the series, ση, is found to be 0.011, and the autoregressive coefficient of the credit shock process,
ρθ, is estimated to be 0.848.
The leverage factor of firms is derived using the Federal Reserve Flows of Funds data, Table
L.102 (levels data) on US non-farm nonfinancial corporate business, following Fiore and Uhlig
(2005). Debt is defined as bank loans and corporate bonds (lines 39+26), and equity is defined as
the market value of equities outstanding (line 37). The proportion of debt finance in total finance
27See, for example, Moody (2010). The data source is Moody’s Analytics Credit Research Database (CRD), which
collects quarterly data from 15 US lending organizations, representing both large institutions and smaller regional
banks. The CRD defines default consistent with the Basel II directive.
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between 1985Q1 to 2009Q4 is around 0.3, which implies a firm leverage ratio of around 1.43.28
Finally, we entertain three different values of µθ, the mean of the loan to deposit ratio in our
calibration exercises. In particular, we consider µθ = {0.95, 1, 1.05}.
Table 2: Steady State Values and Loan to Deposit Ratio
Steady state values
r∗d r
∗
l N˚
∗ W˚ ∗ C˚∗ Y˚ ∗ K˚∗ L˚∗ S˚∗ D˚∗
0.95 0.007 0.121 1 0.350 0.369 0.538 0.167 0.050 0.117 0.053
µθ 1 0.007 0.070 1 0.360 0.373 0.553 0.181 0.054 0.126 0.054
1.05 0.007 0.021 1 0.369 0.376 0.568 0.195 0.058 0.136 0.056
Note: The steady state values are computed based on the parameter values given in Table 1. The steady
state of labour hours in efficiency unit N˚∗ is normalised to 1.
The steady state values of the model variables in efficiency units can be obtained using equations
(4.22) to (4.27), and the steady state values are given in Table 2. It is interesting to note that,
in the steady state, output per capita, consumption per capita and capital per capita in efficiency
units rise with µθ, which measures the availability of loans and the extent of leverage in the banking
sector. This finding suggests that as the banking sector becomes more leveraged and the extent of
financial intermediation increases, the steady state output per capita level in the economy tends
to be higher. The result is consistent with empirical studies on the relationship between finance
and development, where more developed banking sector is often associated with faster economic
development (see for example Levine, 2005). Note also that, when the banking sector becomes more
leveraged, the interest rate charged on loans tends to fall. For example, when µθ increases from 1
(no leverage) to 1.05, real loan rate reduces from an implausibly high rate of 7% per quarter (28%
per annum) to around 8% per annum, yielding an interest rate spread of around 5% per annum,
which is more reasonable. The results suggest that, in order to meet the break-even condition,
in equilibrium the banking sector could either charge a high loan interest rate to cover the losses
resulting from firm defaults, or to take on more risks by increasing leverage, in the form of security
issuance, for example.
Since an important focus of this paper is to examine the impact of firm defaults on macroeco-
nomic conditions, we also compute the steady state values of the model economy by varying some
of the key parameters that determine the equilibrium default probability, namely, the leverage ratio
of the firms, υ, and the standard deviations of common and idiosyncratic technology shocks, σ
and σλ. Recall from (3.26) and (3.27) that default probability rises with firm’s leverage ratio and
the standard deviations of technology shocks. The results in Table 3 confirm this prediction in the
steady states. For firm’s leverage ratio, υ, we consider three scenarios with υ = {1.25, 1.43, 1.67},
where the proportion of debt finance in total finance is 20%, 30% (US data), and 40%, respectively.
As the results in Table 3 show, the probability of default rises from 0.086% to 2.33% per quarter
when firm’s leverage ratio increases from 1.43 to 1.67, with the interest rate on loans doubling from
7% to 14.8%. We also observe a fall in the steady state levels of per capita consumption, output
28This result is very similar to Fiore and Uhlig (2005), who find that the debt to total finance ratio is around
0.3 and a leverage ratio of around 1.43 for US non-farm, non-financial corporate business sector, using the shorter
sample period of 1997 to 2003.
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Table 3: Steady State Values and Default Probability
Steady state values
r∗d r
∗
l N˚
∗ W˚ ∗ C˚∗ Y˚ ∗ K˚∗ L˚∗ S˚∗ D˚∗ κ
Panel A
1.25 0.007 0.033 1 0.367 0.373 0.564 0.191 0.038 0.153 0.038 0.0026
υ 1.43 0.007 0.070 1 0.360 0.373 0.553 0.181 0.054 0.126 0.054 0.0086
1.67 0.007 0.148 1 0.345 0.370 0.531 0.160 0.064 0.096 0.064 0.0233
Panel B
0.001 0.007 0.070 1 0.360 0.373 0.554 0.181 0.054 0.126 0.054 0.0086
σ 0.011 0.007 0.070 1 0.360 0.373 0.553 0.181 0.054 0.126 0.054 0.0086
0.110 0.007 0.085 1 0.357 0.372 0.550 0.177 0.053 0.124 0.053 0.0105
Panel C
0.33 0.007 0.013 1 0.369 0.372 0.568 0.196 0.059 0.137 0.059 0.0009
σλ 0.43 0.007 0.070 1 0.360 0.373 0.553 0.181 0.054 0.126 0.054 0.0086
0.53 0.007 0.221 1 0.333 0.369 0.513 0.144 0.043 0.101 0.043 0.0281
Note: The steady state values in Panels A, B and C are computed based on the parameter values given in Table
1, with µθ=1 and the values of υ, σ and σλ given in this table, respectively. The steady state of labour hours in
efficiency unit N˚∗ is normalised to 1.
and capital, when firm’s leverage ratio rises, despite an increase in the level of loans per capita,
since a larger proportion of the loans are non-performing and the steady state value of private
equity per capita is falling (substitution effect). As to be expected, the probability of default rises
with the volatility of common and idiosyncratic technology shocks (see Panels B and C of Table
3). The steady state levels of per capita output, consumption and loans decline with increased
volatility. Finally, note that in the steady state Y˚ ∗ = C˚∗ + S˚∗ + D˚∗, that is output is divided into
consumption and savings, comprised of private equity investment, S˚∗, and bank deposits, D˚∗, as
implied by equation (4.15).
6 Results of the Calibration Exercise
6.1 Effects of credit and technology shocks
Initially, we consider the impacts of a positive credit shock. As can be seen in Figure 1, the impulse
responses for a positive credit shock yield an increase in loans of around one percent on impact.29
The rise in the level of loans leads to an increase in available capital in the economy and a
rise in output level of around 0.6%. The increase in the supply of funds also drives down the
interest rate on loans by almost half a percent, and leads to a fall in the interest rate spread by
around 1%, as predicted by Proposition 2. Deposit rate rises by around 0.6% on impact, which in
turn implies an increase in the level of deposits of around 1% at its peak, consistent with the zero
profit condition imposed on the banking sector. In absence of a technology shock, labour hours
rise in response to the decline in loan interest rates (see Proposition 2). The resulting increase in
labour income raises household consumption, by around 0.4% on impact. Further, productivity
rises since output increases more than labour hours on impact. Our findings are consistent with
the impulse responses of a shock to bank capital, which predicts that the level of loans, output,
29A negative credit shock can be interpreted as a credit crunch.
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Figure 1: Impulse responses of one s.e positive credit shock
(Benchmark Calibration, µθ = 1, percent per quarter)
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labour hours and household consumption move in the same direction (see, for example Aikman
and Paustian, 2006). It is worth highlighting that our findings are also in line with the empirical
evidence of responses to a US credit shock, where output and short term interest rates (deposit
rate can be seen as a proxy) move in the same direction as the credit shock (see, for example,
Helbling, Huidrom, Kose, and Otrok, 2011 and Xu, 2010).
We then consider the impact of a positive technology shock. As can be seen from Figure 2,
the shock results in higher deposit and loan rates, with no impacts on the interest rate spread, as
shown in Proposition 2. Loan rate rises as the marginal product of capital increases following a
positive technology shock, and the zero profit condition of the banking sector ensues an increase
in the deposit rate which reaches to almost 0.5% at its peak. The rise in loan rate leads to a fall in
the level of loans in the economy and consequently a fall in the level of deposits, again due to the
zero profit condition of the banking sector. The response in hours is negative, which is consistent
with the empirical evidence that positive technology shocks lead to short-run declines in hours
(see Section 2.2 and references cited therein). Consumption initially increases by 0.4% following
the positive technology shock but falls after two quarters, reflecting the reduction in household
31
Figure 2: Impulse responses of one s.e positive shock to technology
(Benchmark Calibration, µθ = 1, percent per quarter)
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disposable income due to a decline in hours. Output initially increases by 0.3% on impact and we
observe a correction before the economy returns to its equilibrium after around five quarters. We
also observe an initial positive response in productivity, which is in line with the empirical evidence
that productivity rises following a positive technology shock and that technology shocks induce a
negative correlation between productivity and hours.
Our calibrated results show that the speed of convergence to equilibrium is much faster for
the technology shock as compared to the effects of the credit shock. On average, it takes around
five quarters for the effects of the technology shock to vanish, whilst it takes around 20 quarters
for the effects of the credit shock to disappear. The peak impacts of a credit shock on output
and consumption are around twice as large as those associated with a technology shock. This
observation is consistent with empirical studies on the output effect of financial crises, which
suggest that recessions associated with financial crises have been more severe and longer lasting
than recessions associated with other shocks (see, for example, IMF, World Economic Outlook,
April 2009, Chapter 3). The prolonged effects of the credit shock also reflects the high persistence
in the loan to deposit ratio that we observe empirically, where the autoregressive coefficient of the
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credit shock is found to be 0.848, as compared to the autoregressive coefficient of the technology
shock which is set to 0.439 in the calibration exercise.
6.2 Robustness of the results
6.2.1 Alternative mean of loan to deposit ratio
In order to check the robustness of our calibrated results, we carried out three further experiments.
Figure 3: Impulse responses of one s.e positive credit shock
(µθ = 1.05, 1 and 0.95)
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µθ= 1.05
µθ= 1
µθ= 0.95
First, we examine the sensitivity of the impulse responses of a positive credit shock to the mean
loan to deposit ratio, µθ. As we have seen in Table 2, the steady state values of output per capita,
consumption per capita and interest rate spreads are sensitive to the choice of µθ. The impulse
responses in Figure 3 suggest that, while the steady state values are sensitive to the value of µθ, the
impulse responses to a positive credit shock and the dynamics of the model are robust to the mean
of loan to deposit ratio in the economy. We also find similar results for the technology shock.30
30Due to space considerations, the impulse responses to a positive technology shock are not presented here, but
are available upon request.
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6.2.2 Lower persistence in the credit shock
In the second experiment, we consider the robustness of our results to the value of ρθ, the au-
toregressive coefficient of the credit shock. We reduce the benchmark estimate of ρθ from 0.848 to
0.678 (by 20%). The results are displayed in Figure 4. We observe faster convergence in the impact
of the credit shock when the autoregressive coefficient is reduced, in particular, it takes around 8
to 10 quarters for the impact to vanish, as compared to around 20 quarters in the benchmark case.
The magnitude of the response in the level of loans, output and consumption is robust on impact,
around twice as large as the impact of a technology shock, consistent with the empirical evidence
that recessions associated with financial crisis tend to be more severe than recessions associated
with other shocks. We also find a lower value for the peak impact of a positive credit shock on
output when ρθ is reduced.
Figure 4: Impulse responses of one s.e positive credit shock
(ρθ = 0.848 and 0.678, µθ = 1)
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ρθ= 0.848
ρθ= 0.678
6.2.3 Higher volatility in the credit shock
In the third experiment, we increase the volatility of the credit shock, as measured by ση, by
50% above the value implied by US data, thus increasing ση from 1.1% to 1.65%. As can be
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seen in Figure 5, the peak response in output, consumption and the level of loans is around 50%
higher when ση = 1.65%. We also note a slower rate of convergence to equilibrium. The volatility
of the credit shock, ση, has an impact on the dynamics of the model since it affects the steady
state conditions of the model through E(lnθt), given by equation (3.42), and therefore enters the
coefficients of the log-linearised approximation of the equilibrium conditions and influences the
dynamics of the model. This result confirms our finding that a credit shock could lead to profound
impact on the real economy, both in terms of the magnitude and duration of the responses, and
the impact could be even more severe during a banking crisis that is coupled with elevated market
volatility.
Figure 5: Impulse responses of one s.e positive credit shock
(ση = 1.1% and 1.65%, µθ = 1)
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ση= 1.1%
ση= 1.65%
6.3 Comparison to a baseline model
To determine the exact mechanism through which hours fall following a positive technology shock
in our model, we compare the responses to a positive technology shock in our model (denoted
by DSGE-LD) with a baseline model without the banking sector and firm defaults (denoted by
DSGE-Baseline). The difference between the two models is twofold: first, in the simplified baseline
model, we rule out idiosyncratic technology shocks and consider only the impact of a common
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technology shock on the economy; second, the household supplies all the capital demanded by the
representative firm. With these two differences, we effectively “switch off” the banking sector and
firm defaults in the simplified model economy, DSGE-Baseline.31 As can be seen from Figure 6, the
baseline model with a non-separable utility function and a reasonable coefficient of risk aversion
(γ = 1) is also capable of generating a fall in labour hours in response to a positive technology
shock. The comparison between the full model and the baseline model reveals that the existence of
banking sector and firm defaults may not be the key features that generate the observed responses
in hours and productivity following a positive technology shock.
Figure 6: Impulse responses of one s.e positive shock to technology (comparison
with a baseline model, µθ = 1)
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Instead, the negative responses in labour hours could possibly result from the specification of
unit root in labour hours, the special functional form of non-separable utility in our model and the
specification that technology shocks are realised after decisions on labour hours are made by firms.
Empirical evidence on US hours data suggests the existence of a unit root in the hours series (see
for example Francis and Ramey, 2005, 2009). We allow for a unit root in the technological process
31The details of the baseline model can be found in the Supplement, available from the authors upon request.
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in our theoretical model, to generate the observed random walk property of US output, labour
hours, consumption, loans and deposits.32 Note also, Francis and Ramey (2009) show that if per
capita labour input in empirical models is treated as a unit root process, the results predict a fall
in labour input in response to a positive shock to technology. In addition, the special functional
form of non-separable utility could contribute to the observed responses in hours and productivity,
as the labour supply schedule is a function of real wage only and not of consumption.
It is important to note that the mechanism through which hours fall following a positive tech-
nology shock in this model differs from the existing literature. Gali (1999) proposes the use of
sticky-price model where technology shocks have negative effects on labour in the short run.33
Francis and Ramey (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007) argue that a flexible price model with
habit formation in consumption combined with adjustment costs in investment is also able to gen-
erate the negative correlation between productivity and hours. In Francis and Ramey (2005), habit
persistence induces a sluggishness in the response of consumption and the high adjustment cost on
investment makes investment relatively expensive in the short run and leave households with the
only remaining alternative that is higher level of leisure, i.e. shorter hours. In our model, labour
and capital move in the same direction, since there is no additional friction in the economy (such
as adjustment cost or habit persistence in consumption), so that household would not respond
differently to leisure and investment as in Francis and Ramey (2005).
Finally, we find that our results of a negative response in hours is robust to the choice of the
coefficient of risk aversion. For reasonable values of γ, we observe a negative response in labour
hours, with the magnitude of responses decreasing in the coefficient of risk aversion. The findings
are consistent with Gali (2008, Chapter 2), which suggests that the responses in labour hours
to a positive technology shock depend on the coefficient of risk aversion γ (which also measures
the strength of wealth effect of labour supply in Gali’s setting). However, the results from our
calibrated model suggest that the negative responses in labour hours hold for a much wider range
of parameter values. In particular, our model does not suggest a positive response in labour hours
whenever γ < 1, as implied by Gali (2008, Chapter 2).34
7 Conclusion
This paper develops a parsimonious theoretical model for the analysis of the effects of credit
and technology shocks on the real economy. It advances a new approach to modelling financial
intermediation and firm defaults, and the financial implications of such defaults on behaviour of
the household and the banking sector, without requiring collateral constraints and monitoring.
It also incorporates growth into a DSGE framework and proposes a new method of computing
steady states, which allows the steady state values of the model to depend on the volatility of the
32If we were to generate stationary hours in our model, it would require the technology process to be stationary,
and results in a stationary output process which contradicts with overwhelming empirical evidence.
33Gali (1999) argues that a positive technology shock can lead to a decline in labour input if the monetary authority
is not too accommodative. Other papers in favour of sticky price model include Basu, Fernald, and Kimball (2006),
King and Wolman (1996) and Dotsey (2002).
34Using a model with separable isoelastic utility function and a production function with decreasing scale in labour
(no capital), Gali (2008, Chapter 2) finds that when γ < 1, the substitution effect of labour supply resulting from a
higher wage dominates the negative effect caused by a smaller marginal utility of consumption, leading to an increase
in employment, with the converse being true whenever γ > 1.
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technology and credit shocks.
We show that a positive credit shock, defined as a rise in the loan to deposit ratio, leads to an
increase in available capital in the economy and a rise in output level, which is largely consistent
with the empirical findings in the companion paper Xu (2010). The positive credit shock also
drives down the spread between loan and deposit rates. The effects of the credit shock are found
to be much more persistent and profound than the effects of a technology shock, consistent with
empirical studies on the output effects of financial crises, which suggest that recessions associated
with financial crisis have been more severe and long lasting than recessions associated with other
shocks.
The current modelling framework can be extended and enhanced along several dimensions.
First, a more elaborate banking sector including bank capital can be considered, to allow for
endogenous credit and leverage shocks. Second, it would be important to consider the risks as
well as the benefits of high leverage, the latter being highlighted in the current framework. One
way of introducing potential costs of leverage is to augment the model with price rigidities and a
central bank operating under a monetary policy rule such as the Taylor rule, to capture possible
inflationary pressure from high leverage, and to study the policy implications of credit shocks.
Alternatively, one could incorporate leverage costs in the production function, to establish a direct
link between excess leverage and low productivity in the economy. Third, the assumption of full
depreciation of capital can be relaxed, which would allow for a richer set of dynamic interactions
in the economy through investment decisions. Finally, it would be important that the model is
confronted with the times series data, using estimation methods along the lines of Smets and
Wouters (2007), and Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2008).
38
A Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Recall that λit is independently and identically distributed across i and t and λit ∼
N(0, σ2λ). Then ∫ $1−εt
−∞
eϕxfλ(x)dx =
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−∞
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Now let % =
(
x− σ2λϕ
)
/σλ, then
∫ $1−εt
−∞
1√
2pi
exp
[
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2
λϕ)
2
2σ2λ
]
dx =
∫ $1−εt−σ2λϕ
σλ
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1√
2pi
exp
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2
2
)
σλd%
= σλΦ
(
$1 − εt − σ2λϕ
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,
where Φ (·) is the cumulative distribution of a standard normal. Then (A1) becomes∫ $1−εt
−∞
eϕxfλ(x)dx = MλΦ
(
$1 − εt − σ2λϕ
σλ
)
,
where Mλ = exp
(
σ2λϕ
2
2
)
and $1 =
ln(1−αυ )
ϕ +
ϕσ2ζ
2 from equations (3.24) and (3.22).
B Model Derivation and Solution
B1 Equilibrium conditions in efficiency units
The system of equation in (4.1) to (4.12) can be further simplified into a 9-equation system in 9
unknowns Ct, Nt, Dt, Lt, St,Kt, Yt, Rlt, and Rdt by eliminating Wt, Πtb and Πtc. As stated earlier,
since this model depicts a growing economy where technology grows with a deterministic trend µ,
we must scale the endogenous variables Ct, Lt, Dt, St, Kt, Nt and Yt in the system of equilibrium
conditions by an appropriate factor of technology At−1 so that they are stationary on a balanced
growth path, to guarantee the existence of steady state in solving the model. Denote the variables
in efficiency unit by capital letters with a dot, C˚t =
Ct
At−1 , L˚t =
Lt
At−1 , S˚t =
St
At−1 , D˚t =
Lt
At−1 ,
K˚t =
Kt
At−1 , N˚t =
Nt
A
1/(1+χ)
t−1
, Y˚t =
Yt
At−1 .
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The equilibrium conditions in efficiency units can be written as
1 = E
β( C˚t+1 − χ01+χN˚1+χt+1
C˚t − χ01+χN˚1+χt
)−γ
g−γt Rd,t+1|Ωct
 ,
Y˚t − C˚t = S˚t + D˚t+1gt,
K˚t =
αχ0
1− α ·
N˚1+χt
Rlt
,
N˚t =
[
1− α
αχ0
(αMλMε)
1
1−α
] 1
χ
exp
[
µ(1− ρu)
1 + χ
]
(Rlt)
− α
(1−α)χ g
ρu
1+χ
t−1 ,
Y˚t = Mλg
ϕ
t N˚t
1−αK˚αt ,
L˚t = (1− 1
υ
)K˚t, K˚t = L˚t + S˚t, L˚t = θtD˚t,
RdtD˚t = RltL˚t(1− κ)− χ0(κ− τ)N˚1+χt .
The above system of equations can be further simplified to a system of six equations by elimi-
nating L˚t, S˚t and K˚t. The equilibrium conditions in terms of C˚t, D˚t, N˚t, Y˚t, Rdt and Rlt are then
given by
1 = E
β( C˚t+1 − χ01+χN˚1+χt+1
C˚t − χ01+χN˚1+χt
)−γ
g−γt Rd,t+1|Ωct
 , (B1)
Y˚t − C˚t = 1
υ − 1θtD˚t + D˚t+1gt, (B2)
θtD˚t =
αχ0(1− 1υ )
1− α ·
N˚1+χt
Rlt
, (B3)
N˚t =
[
1− α
αχ0
(αMλMε)
1
1−α
] 1
χ
exp
[
µ(1− ρu)
1 + χ
]
(Rlt)
− α
(1−α)χ g
ρu
1+χ
t−1 , (B4)
Y˚t = Mλg
ϕ
t N˚t
1−α
[
θtD˚t
(1− 1υ )
]α
, (B5)
RdtD˚t = RltθtD˚t(1− κ)− χ0(κ− τ)N˚1+χt . (B6)
B2 Derivation of the steady states
Denote the variables in steady state by the lower case letters with a star, for example, the steady
state of consumption is given by c˚∗ = E(lnC˚t) and the steady state of loan rate is r∗l = E(lnRlt) ≈
E(rlt). To derive the steady state, we first take logarithm of the equilibrium conditions (B3) to
(B5) and take unconditional expectations of the resulting equations, we have
E(lnθt) + d˚
∗ = lnχ0 + ln
[
α(1− 1υ )
1− α
]
+ (1 + χ)˚n∗ − r∗l ,
n˚∗ = − lnχ0
χ
+
1
χ
ln
[
1− α
α
(αMλMε)
1
1−α
]
+
µ
1 + χ
− α
(1− α)χr
∗
l ,
y˚∗ = ln
[
Mλ
(1− 1υ )α
]
+ ϕµ+ (1− α)˚n∗ + αE(lnθt) + αd˚∗,
as ln(gt) = µ+ ut and E(lngt) = µ.
To obtain the steady state conditions for equation (B2), first note that C˚t can be approximated
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as follows
C˚t = e
c˚t ≈ ec˚∗(1 + ˜˚ct)
where ˜˚ct = c˚t − c˚∗. Then equation (B2) can be approximated by
ey˚
∗
(1 + ˜˚yt)− ec˚∗(1 + ˜˚ct) = eE(lnθt)+d˚∗υ − 1 (1 + l˜nθt)(1 + ˜˚dt) + ed˚∗(1 + ˜˚dt+1)eµ(1 + l˜ngt)
where l˜n gt = ln gt − E(ln gt) and l˜n θt = ln θt − E(ln θt). Take unconditional expectation on both
sides of the above equation and we have that in steady state
ey˚
∗ − ec˚∗ = ed˚∗+µ + 1
υ − 1e
E(lnθt)+d˚∗ .
Similarly, the steady state condition for equation (B6) is given by
er
∗
ded˚
∗
= er
∗
l +E(lnθt)+d˚
∗
(1− κ)− χ0(κ− τ)e(1+χ)˚n
∗
.
Finally, to derive the steady state condition for equation (B1), first note that we can approxi-
mate C˚t and N˚
1+χ
t as follows
C˚t+1 − χ01+χN˚1+χt+1
C˚t − χ01+χN˚1+χt
=
1 + 11−b1
˜˚ct+1 − b11−b1 (1 + χ)˜˚nt+1
1 + 11−b1
˜˚ct − b11−b1 (1 + χ)˜˚nt ,
where b1 =
χ0
1+χe
(1+χ)˚n∗−c˚∗ . Taking first order Taylor expansion, we have that following approxi-
mation (
C˚t+1 − χ01+χN˚1+χt+1
C˚t − χ01+χN˚1+χt
)−γ
≈ 1− γ
1− b1
˜˚ct+1 + b1γ
1− b1 (1 + χ)
˜˚nt+1 + γ
1− b1
˜˚ct − b1γ
1− b1 (1 + χ)
˜˚nt.
Furthermore, we can approximate g−γt Rd,t+1 in equation (B1) by the following
g−γt Rd,t+1 ≈ b2(1− γ l˜n gt + r˜d,t+1)
where b2 = e
−γµ+r∗d . Therefore, equation (B1) is approximated by
1
βb2
− 1 = E
[
− γ
1− b1
(˜˚ct+1 − ˜˚ct)+ b1γ(1 + χ)
1− b1
(˜˚nt+1 − ˜˚nt)− γ l˜n gt + r˜d,t+1|Ωct] (B7)
Now, take unconditional expectation on both sides of (B7) and by the law of iterated expecta-
tions, the right hand side of equation (B7) is equal to zero. In steady state, we then have βb2 = 1,
which together with b2 = e
−γµ+r∗d , we obtain r∗d = γµ− lnβ.
B3 Loglinearisation
We log-linearise the system of equilibrium equations around the steady state of the log of the
variables and denote the variables with a tilde the log deviations from the steady state of the log of
the variables, e.g. ˜˚ct = c˚t − c˚∗. Note again that C˚t can be approximated as C˚t = e˚ct ≈ e˚c∗(1 + ˜˚ct).
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For equations (B3) to (B5), the log approximations are given by
l˜n θt +
˜˚
dt + r˜lt = (1 + χ) ˜˚nt˜˚nt = − α
(1− α)χr˜lt +
ρu
1 + χ
l˜n gt−1
˜˚y = ϕl˜n gt + (1− α) ˜˚nt + αl˜n θt + α˜˚dt
For equation (B2), first note that it can be approximated by
ey˚
∗
(1 + ˜˚yt)− ec˚∗(1 + ˜˚ct)
= ed˚
∗
(1 +
˜˚
dt+1)e
µ(1 + l˜n gt) +
1
υ − 1e
E(lnθt)(1 + l˜n θt)e
d˚∗(1 +
˜˚
dt)
while in the steady state
ey˚
∗ − ec˚∗ = ed˚∗+µ + 1
υ − 1e
E(lnθt)+d˚∗
then the log approximation is given by
ey˚
∗−c˚∗˜˚yt − ˜˚ct = ed˚∗+µ−c˚∗ (˜˚dt+1 + l˜n gt)+ 1υ − 1eE(lnθt)+d˚∗−c˚∗
(
l˜n θt +
˜˚
dt
)
Similarly, the log-linearised approximation for equation (B6) is given by
er
∗
d+d˚
∗
(
r˜dt +
˜˚
dt
)
= er
∗
l +E(lnθt)+d˚
∗
(1− κ)
(
r˜lt +
˜˚
dt + l˜nθt
)
− χ0(κ− τ)(1 + χ)e(1+χ)˚n
∗ ˜˚nt.
Finally, to log-linearise equation (B1), first recall that it can be approximated by equation (B7).
Note that 1βb2 − 1 = 0 in steady state, then we have the following log approximation
˜˚ct − b1(1 + χ)˜˚nt = E [˜˚ct+1 − b1(1 + χ)˜˚nt+1 + (1− b1)l˜n gt − 1− b1γ r˜d,t+1|Ωct
]
.
The log-linearised approximation of the equilibrium conditions of the model are therefore,
noting l˜n gt = ut,
˜˚ct − a1˜˚nt = E (˜˚ct+1 − a1˜˚nt+1 − a3r˜d,t+1|Ωct)+ a2ut, (B8)
−˜˚ct + a5˜˚yt − a6˜˚dt+1 = a4˜˚dt + a6ut + a4 l˜n θt, (B9)˜˚nt + α
(1− α)χr˜lt =
ρu
1 + χ
ut−1, (B10)
a9˜˚nt + a7r˜dt − a8r˜lt = − (a7 − a8) ˜˚dt + a8 l˜nθt, (B11)˜˚yt − (1− α) ˜˚nt = α˜˚dt + ϕut + αl˜n θt, (B12)
(1 + χ) ˜˚nt − r˜lt = ˜˚dt + l˜n θt, (B13)
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where
a1 = b1(1 + χ), a2 = 1− b1, a3 = 1− b1
γ
,
a4 =
1
υ − 1e
E(lnθt)+d˚∗−c˚∗ , a5 = ey˚
∗−c˚∗ , a6 = ed˚
∗+µ−c˚∗ ,
a7 = e
r∗d+d˚
∗
, a8 = e
r∗l +E(lnθt)+d˚
∗
(1− κ),
a9 = χ0(κ− τ)(1 + χ)e(1+χ)˚n
∗
, b1 =
χ0
1 + χ
e(1+χ)˚n
∗−c˚∗ .
Using the expressions for a4, a5, a6, a7, a8 and a9 above, steady state conditions (4.25) and
(4.27) can be re-written as
a5 = 1 + a4 + a6, a9 = (1 + χ)(a8 − a7).
Note also the above system of equations can be simplified by substituting
˜˚
dt from equation (B13)
in equations (B11) and (B12), then the log-linearised equations (B9), (B11) and (B12) can be
re-written as the expressions in the main body of the paper.
B4 Solution of the Canonical RE model
Proof. We show that xt = Cxt−1 + D0ξt + D1ξt−1 is indeed a solution of
xt = Axt−1 + BE(xt+1|Ωt) + G0ξt + G1ξt−1. (B14)
First, note that the left hand side of (B14) can be written as
xt = Cxt−1 + D0ξt + D1ξt−1
= C(Cxt−2+D0ξt−1+D1ξt−2) + D0ξt + D1ξt−1
= C2xt−2+D0ξt+(CD0+D1)ξt−1+CD1ξt−2.
To evaluate the right hand side of (B14), note that
E(xt+1|Ωt) = E(Cxt + D0ξt+1 + D1ξt|Ωt)
= Cxt + D0E(ξt+1|Ωt) + D1ξt
= C(Cxt−1 + D0ξt + D1ξt−1) + D0Rξt + D1ξt
= C2xt−1 + (CD0 + D0R + D1) ξt + CD1ξt−1
= C2(Cxt−2+D0ξt−1+D1ξt−2) + (CD0 + D0R + D1) ξt + CD1ξt−1
= C3xt−2 + (CD0 + D0R + D1) ξt + (C
2D0 + CD1)ξt−1 + C
2D1ξt−2.
Therefore the right hand side of (B14) is given by
Axt−1 + BE(xt+1|Ωt) + G0ξt + G1ξt−1
= A(Cxt−2+D0ξt−1+D1ξt−2) + BE(xt+1|Ωt) + G0ξt + G1ξt−1
= A(Cxt−2+D0ξt−1+D1ξt−2) + G0ξt + G1ξt−1
+BC3xt−2 + (BCD0 + BD0R + BD1) ξt + (BC
2D0 + BCD1)ξt−1 + BC
2D1ξt−2
= (AC+BC3)xt−2 + (G0+BCD0 + BD0R + BD1)ξt
+(AD0 + G1 + BC
2D0 + BCD1)ξt−1 + (AD1 + BC
2D1)ξt−2.
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Equating the coefficients of xt−2, ξt, ξt−1 and ξt−2 on both sides of (B14), we have
xt−2 : C2 = AC+BC3,
ξt : D0 = G0+BCD0 + BD0R + BD1,
ξt−1 : CD0+D1 = AD0 + G1 + BC
2D0 + BCD1,
ξt−2 : CD1 = AD1 + BC
2D1.
The above conditions can be simplified to
BC2 + A−C = 0, D1 = (I−BC)−1G1,
(I−BC)D0 −BD0R = G0 + BD1,
that is
(I−BC)D0 −BD0R = G0 + B(I−BC)−1G1
which is the solution given by (4.38).
C Data Appendix
C1 Data sources
The main sources of the time series data are Datastream and the Federal Reserve.
C1.1 Deposit rate
The Datastream series “US CD Secondary Market 1 Month - Middle Rate” (FRCDS1M), “US CD
Secondary Market 3 Month - Middle Rate” (FRCDS3M), “US CD Secondary Market 6 Month -
Middle Rate” (FRCDS6M) are used to constructed the deposit rate series used in the paper. The
deposit rate is given by the arithmetic average of the 1M, 3M and 6M CD series. The source for
the Datastream series is the Federal Reserve and the series are measured in percent per annum.
The middle rate refers to the midpoint between the bid and offered rates.
We have decided to use the Datastream (Federal Reserve) series instead of the IFS series “US
Certificate of Deposit rate 3 months (secondary market)” (60LC.ZF), since the Federal Reserve
has a broader coverage of CD rates, to include the 1 Month and 6 Month CD rates, which we use
to construct the final deposit rates series.
C1.2 Loan rate
We take the Datastream series “US Bank Prime Loan - Middle Rate” (FRBKPRM) as our preferred
measure for loan rate. The source of this series is the Federal Reserve. The US Bank Prime Loan
Rate is the rate posted by a majority of top 25 (by assets in domestic offices) insured U.S.-chartered
commercial banks. Prime is one of the several base rates used by banks to price short-term business
loans. Weekly figures are averages of 7 calendar days ending on Wednesday of the current week;
monthly figures include each calendar day in the month. The interest rate is annualized using
a 360-day year or bank interest and the middle rate refers to the midpoint between the bid and
offered rates. We have decided to use the Datastream (Federal Reserve) series instead of the IFS
series “Bank prime loan rate” (60P..ZF), in order to be consistent with the source of our deposit
rate series.
C1.3 CPI series
Note that, both the series for loan rate and deposit rate are in nominal terms. In order to estimate
our model, we would need to convert the nominal loan and deposit rates to real series, using a
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measure of inflation rate. We take the CPI series “Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers:
All Items” from the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis (series ID: CPIAUCSL). The series is
seasonally adjusted and indexed at the years 1982-84 (=100).
C1.4 Consumption
We use the data series “US Real Personal Consumption Expenditures” (series ID: PCECC96)
from Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis as our measure for consumption. The data source is U.S.
Department of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis and the quarterly series is seasonally
adjusted in billions of chained 2005 prices.
C1.5 Output
The GDP series is taken from the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis (series ID: GDPC96). The
series is seasonally adjusted in billions of chained 2005 prices.
C1.6 Bank deposits
We use the Federal Reserve series “US commercial bank liabilities–deposits and borrowing” (source:
Federal Reserve H8 Table) as a measure of bank deposits. The series is measured in billions of
US dollars, current prices and seasonally adjusted. According to the Federal Reserve definition,
www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm (page 2), deposits is composed of large
time deposits and other deposits.
C1.7 Bank credit
The data series on bank credit (“US Commercial bank assets–bank credit”) is taken from the
Federal Reserve H8 Table. According to the Federal Reserve definition, bank credit is comprised
of securities in bank credit and loans and leases in bank credit.35 The latter (loans and leases
in bank credit) includes commercial and industrial loans, real estate loans and commercial loans.
The reason that we are using credit series from the Federal reserve, rather than the IFS measure
“Bank credit to the private sector” as in the empirical paper, is that there is no matching deposit
series from the IFS, while such series exists in the Federal reserve. The data series on bank credit
is seasonally adjusted and expressed in billions of dollars in current prices.
C1.8 Wage
The Federal Reserve series on “Average Hourly Earnings: Total Private Industries” is used as a
proxy for wages. The data source is the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louise (Series ID: AHETPI),
taken from the U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics. The data series is seasonally
adjusted and expressed in dollars per hour.
C1.9 Hours worked
The data series on “Average Weekly Hours Private Non-farm United States” is taken from Datas-
tream (USHKIP..O). The primary sources of the data is the Bureau of labor statistics (USDOL).
The series is measured in hours and seasonally adjusted. It captures the expected or actual period
of employment for the week, usually expressed in number of hours.
35See http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm (page 2) for details.
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C1.10 Employment
The employment data (“All Employees: Total Private Industries”) is given by the Federal Re-
serve Bank of St Louise (Series ID: USPRIV). The series is measured in thousands and seasonally
adjusted. The source of the data is the U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
C1.11 US population
The US population data (“US Population: Mid-Month”) is given by the Federal Reserve Bank
of St Louis (series ID: POPTHM). The series is measured in thousands. The source is the U.S.
Department of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
C1.12 Liabilities of non-financial non farm corporate business
We take the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds series (levels data, Table L.102) on the liabilities of
nonfarm nonfinancial corporate business, in particular, we are interested in the series on corporate
bonds (Z1/FL103163003.Q), corporate equities (Z1/FL103164103) and loans and short-term paper
(Z1/FL104140005.Q). The series are measured in millions of US dollar.
The data series are available upon request.
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